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This Article advocates passage of a law requiring members of Con-
gress to disclose the amount of time they spend fundraising.
In the wake of Citizens United and other court decisions severely
limiting lawmakers’ ability to regulate campaign spending, many schol-
ars have turned their focus to campaign finance disclosure laws.  Ac-
cording to some, laws requiring campaigns and donors to reveal the
source of contributions and expenditures are the last bastion of federal
campaign finance law.  Yet despite a history of broad acceptance, disclo-
sure laws rest on an increasingly shaky foundation.
The most troubling aspect of current disclosure law is that it con-
tains loopholes so obvious and irresistible that many political players
choose to spend dark money, the source of which is unidentified.  Fur-
ther, some argue that even when the source of political spending is dis-
closed, the information provided to the electorate is of questionable
usefulness for a host of reasons.  Finally, opponents of disclosure laws
point to their potential chilling effect and threats of retaliation that can
occur when the public learns who supported a certain candidate or bal-
lot measure.  Even those who support disclosure laws have recently con-
ceded that perhaps disclosure requirements should encompass only large
spenders rather than those contributing only a few hundred dollars.
For these reasons, there have been calls to reform federal disclo-
sure law so it is more properly tailored to serve its goals without chilling
speech.  Many have proposed effective, intelligent changes that would
improve the disclosure regime greatly.  However, the current discussion
about disclosure largely ignores the fact that there is a gaping hole in
disclosure requirements: while the electorate receives some information
about a candidate’s financial backers and can learn about a legislator’s
votes and other activities, voters cannot discover how much time their
representatives spend raising money.  Information about legislators’ fun-
* J.D., Columbia Law School 2010.  I’d like to thank Professor Richard Briffault for
helpful comments, as well as Chris Ferguson and Lauren Wright.  Special thanks to Lilli
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draising time is critically important: the average member of Congress
spends between thirty and seventy percent of their time seeking money.
The aim of requiring disclosure of fundraising time would be two-
fold: First, it would supplement current disclosure law by providing new,
valuable information about legislators that is less susceptible to avoid-
ance, is more useful to voters, and would not risk chilling speech.  Sec-
ond, it would discourage legislators from spending egregious amounts of
time fundraising, thereby encouraging them to devote more time to the
jobs they are elected to do.
Though this Article focuses on the discrete proposal of requiring
disclosure of time spent fundraising, it also advocates further scholarly
examination of enhanced disclosure of legislators’ activities.  Such re-
quirements, like the one proposed here, provide greater benefits and
often lack the drawbacks of disclosure laws that seek information from
nongovernment actors.
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INTRODUCTION
Laws requiring reporting and publication of the names and personal
information of campaign spenders have a history of broad support.1
Both federally and in many states, these laws attempt to ensure that the
public will be informed about the people and entities supporting political
campaigns and ballot measures.  They also seek to deter corruption and
aid in enforcing other campaign finance laws by requiring both cam-
paigns and groups engaging in independent spending to provide specific
information concerning their funding sources.2  While First Amendment
and policy arguments have arisen due to concerns over retaliation and the
chilling effect of disclosure laws, the laws have for the most part been
upheld by the courts and were the subject of positive attention by the
Citizens United majority.3
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has broadly upheld the con-
stitutionality of disclosure requirements, federal disclosure laws are
under more scrutiny than ever before.  Loopholes in the legal framework
allow many political advocacy groups to avoid disclosing the source of
their funding.  This prevents the laws from fulfilling their purposes, one
of which is accurately informing voters of the sources of political speech.
These loopholes and the Court’s pronouncement in Citizens United not-
withstanding, opponents of disclosure are increasingly calling for more
1 Until recently, such disclosure laws have enjoyed bipartisan support; even those who
believe that the First Amendment prevents the government from restricting political spending
have often argued in favor of broad disclosure requirements.  Most notably, Justice Kennedy
and three other conservative justices in Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n expressed
support for disclosure provisions. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct.
876, 916 (2010).  However, as the Supreme Court has increasingly limited legislatures’ ability
to regulate contributions and spending, some previously supporting disclosure have begun to
shift their viewpoints. See, e.g., Fred Hiatt, A GOP Bait–and–Switch on Disclosure, WASH-
INGTON POST (June 17, 2012), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fred-hi-
att-a-gop-bait-and-switch-on-disclosure/2012/06/17/gJQATPS2jV_story.html?hpid=z2. See
also Editorial, Disclosure Vote Leaves Trail of Broken Republican Vows, BLOOMBERG VIEW
(Jul. 17, 2012), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-17/disclose-vote-
leaves-trail-of-broken-republican-vows.html; Norman Ornstein, Full Disclosure: The Dra-
matic Turn Away From Campaign Transparency, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 7, 2011, at http://
www.tnr.com/node/88005?page=0,0 (listing prominent conservative voices that have switched
positions on disclosure laws, such as John Boehner, Mitch McConnell, and The Wall Street
Journal).
2 See Part I, infra.
3 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916; Cynthia L. Bauerly & Eric C. Hallstrom, Square
Pegs: The Challenges for Existing Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws in the Age of
the Super PAC, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 329, 351 (“Unlike other aspects of [cam-
paign finance law] that are under challenge after Citizens United, there is no uncertainty from
the Supreme Court about the extent to which effective disclosure is both constitutionally valid
and prudent public policy.”).
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protections for anonymous speech, citing fears of chilled speech and
harassment.4
The dearth of information accessible to voters concerning campaign
funding is just one of the myriad of issues faced by our current campaign
finance system.  Reformers concern themselves with corruption and in-
sider access, to be sure, but also have consistently decried the fact that
members of Congress are essentially forced to be full-time telemarketers,
constantly begging for more money for their next campaign.5  This race
for funds unquestionably debases the legislative process and our govern-
ment as a whole—the only remaining question for debate is the extent of
its detrimental effects.
This Article advocates supplementing the disclosure regime in a
way that would seek to address the electorate’s informational deficit and
dampen the fire that drives the money race.  The simplest version of such
a law, and the principal example explored in this Article, is a requirement
that legislators disclose the amount of time they spend fundraising.6
More comprehensive versions of such a law might require lawmakers to
provide additional information about the individuals and groups from
which they solicit funds.7
Requiring politicians to disclose the amount of time spent fundrais-
ing would offer voters a new basis on which to assess their representa-
tives.  Making the information accessible to the public would increase
awareness of the volume of fundraising that occurs, perhaps spurring
more calls for change.  To some degree, the requirement would lessen
the incentive to spend time fundraising by shining a greater spotlight on
4 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916; see, e.g., James A. Bopp, Jr. & Jared Haynie, The
Tyranny of “Reform and Transparency”: A Plea to the Supreme Court to Revisit and Overturn
Citizens United’s “Disclaimer and Disclosure” Holding, 16 NEXUS: CHAP. J. L. & POL’Y 3,
21 (2011) (“Political Exposure Laws Do Not Prevent Anyone from Speaking in the Same Way
that Jewish Armbands Did Not Prevent Anyone from Practicing Their Religion.”). The Court
has, of course, left the door open for challenges to disclosure laws for individuals and groups
that face true threats of retaliation. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914; see also Doe v. Reed,
130 S. Ct. 2811, 2821 (2010) (reaffirming that “upholding the law against a broad–based
challenge does not foreclose a litigant’s success in a narrower one”).
5 See Part III.A.2, infra.
6 While most commentators focus on disclosure of dollar amounts, Professor Anita
Krishnakumar has made a proposal similar to the one presented here.  She has suggested re-
quiring legislators to make disclosures concerning their contacts with lobbyists. See Anita
Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian, Interest–Group–Based, Approach to Lobbying Regula-
tion, 58 ALA. L. REV. 513, 517, 543, 545-548 (2007) (noting need for focus shift from lobby-
ists to elected officials and arguing that “lobbying regulations should produce information not
only about which lobbyists competing interests hire, or how much lobbyists are paid, but also
about the amount of access that those lobbyists obtain vis–a`–vis specific elected officials”).
7 Such enhanced disclosure laws would dovetail with current reporting requirements to
provide the public with a more complete view of the activities of their legislators, as well as
contribute to better enforcement of fundraising time reporting requirements.
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the activities of legislators.8  More robust versions of such a law would
help connect the dots between donors and insider access.
Part I of this Article briefly explains the framework of current fed-
eral disclosure law, which generally requires candidates to report per-
sonal information about those who contribute to their campaigns.  The
law also requires some independent spending groups to reveal their
funders.  Part I also describes the three typically-cited purposes of disclo-
sure law: providing information to the voting public, preventing corrup-
tion, and assisting in enforcement of other campaign finance laws.
Part II provides historical background of the development of cam-
paign finance law since the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) was
passed after the Watergate scandal.  It explains how disclosure laws fit
into FECA’s existing framework and delves more deeply into the details
of current federal disclosure requirements, supplemented by the 2002 Bi-
partisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA).  Most importantly, it discusses
several of the major obstacles preventing the disclosure regime from
reaching optimal efficacy.  It explains how gaps in the existing law allow
independent spenders to avoid disclosing the identities of the individuals
or corporations funding their efforts.  Part II also addresses shortcomings
of disclosure provisions in general, such as data aggregation problems,
timing problems, and questions concerning disclosed data’s usefulness to
voters.  Finally, it looks at the recent anti-disclosure movement led by
campaign finance reform opponents who attack disclosure laws based on
allegations that they chill speech and subject speakers to retaliation and
harassment.
Part III begins by discussing the benefits of enacting a law that
would require legislators to disclose more of their own campaign finance
activity, namely the amount of time they spend fundraising.9  It con-
cludes that the public has a vital interest in learning information about
the amount of time its representatives spend raising money instead of
performing other legislative functions.  It also examines the deleterious
effects created by the “money race” that dominates legislators’ daily cal-
endars and argues that increasing awareness of legislators’ fundraising
activities would help drive down the time members of Congress spend
soliciting money.
Part III also examines how the proposed law would, to a significant
degree, avoid the three major problems faced by current federal disclo-
sure laws discussed in Part II: avoidance, informational problems, and
concerns over chilling effects and retaliation.  It goes on to address prac-
tical concerns about the proposed law and responds to several potential
8 See generally, Krishnakumar, supra note 6.
9 Naturally, the law would be beneficial if passed by individual states as well.  For the
sake of simplicity, this Article couches the proposal in federal terms.
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counterarguments.  While disclosing fundraising time would add some
work for legislators, the burden would not be overwhelming.  And
though any system relying on self-reporting will face some hurdles, the
design of the law can ameliorate those problems.  Though some would
argue that the law would disadvantage incumbents and provide a leg up
to self-financed candidates, such effects would be minor, especially in
comparison to existing laws, and would not outweigh the benefits of time
disclosure.  The law could also be set up in a way to avoid discouraging
small-donor fundraising.
I. DISCLOSURE LAWS AND THEIR PURPOSE
Disclosure laws cover countless private and public institutions
across the world, regulating corporations, local government entities, la-
bor unions, and other groups and individuals.  The government disclo-
sure laws discussed in this Article share many traits with laws requiring
corporate disclosure: both seek to deter undesirable behavior and address
informational imbalances.  Federal and state campaign finance disclosure
laws address analogous issues by providing information to voters con-
cerning the funding of campaigns and attempting to remedy informa-
tional imbalances that might otherwise “allow corruption to persist in
important institutions that serve the public.”10
In the United States, campaign disclosure laws typically require
candidates, political parties, political action committees (PACs), and
other organizations to disclose information about their spending and fun-
draising.  Under federal law, those actors must disclose information for
contributions of $200 or more to a candidate.11  Importantly, candidates
usually must file disclosure reports before elections are held, allowing
the public to view the information before voting.12  Federal law requires
disclosure of a donor’s name, address, occupation, and employer.13
Many states require similar information.14  Federal law also mandates
reporting of independent spending, which is money that is spent on elec-
tion-related speech but not contributed directly to a candidate, including
10 ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE, THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANS-
PARENCY 41 (2007) (explaining that “confidentiality of campaign contributions prevents voters
from judging whether candidates are beholden to well–heeled interests”).
11 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(a) (2011).
12 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(2) (2011).
13 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3) (2011); 11 C.F.R. s. 104.8 (2012); see also Richard Briffault,
Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELEC. L.J. 273, 277 (2010) [hereinafter Disclosure 2.0].
14 Richard Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign Finance Disclosure After Citizens
United and Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983, 1000 (2011) [hereinafter Two
Challenges]. See also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 980 (2010)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that California law required those donating over $100 to any
group supporting Proposition 8 to disclose name, address, occupation, and employer’s name).
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“electioneering communications.”15  Most states require some disclosure
of independent spending as well.16  Federal law also mandates that ad-
vertisements contain disclaimers identifying their funding sources.17
The specific purposes of campaign-related disclosure laws are often
mentioned but sometimes taken for granted by courts.18  Though there
are three typically-cited bases for campaign finance disclosure (anticor-
ruption, the electorate’s interest in information, and enforcement of other
campaign finance laws, discussed below),19 scholars have cited numer-
ous additional benefits disclosure laws can provide.20
Currently, the first and strongest constitutional basis for disclosure
laws is the electorate’s informational interest in campaign finance data.
As described in Citizens United, disclosure of information about a candi-
date’s supporters allows voters and others to properly assess First
15 Federal law distinguishes electioneering communications from other independent ex-
penditures, stating that an electioneering communication is
any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which (2) refers to a clearly identi-
fied candidate for Federal Office; (II) is made within — (aa) 60 days before a gen-
eral, special, or runoff election for the office sought by the candidate; or (bb) 30 days
before a primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus of a political party
that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought by the candidate;
and (III) in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate for an office
other than President or Vice President, is targeted to the relevant electorate.
2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(2011).  Independent expenditures are expressly excluded from the elec-
tioneering communication definition. Id.  An independent expenditure is an expenditure “ex-
pressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate” that is not made in
cooperation with a candidate.  2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2011).
16 Anne Bauer, Best Practices for Independent Spending, Part One, FOLLOW THE MONEY
(Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.followthemoney.org/press/ReportView.phtml?r=453 (“Twelve
states don’t require any disclosure of independent expenditures, and 32 states either don’t
require disclosure of electioneering communications or don’t have a definition as strong as the
federal definition.”).
17 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1) (2011) (“Every person who makes a disbursement for the direct
costs of producing and airing electioneering communications in an aggregate amount in excess
of $10,000 during any calendar year shall, within 24 hours of each disclosure date, file with
the Commission a statement [providing identifying information]”); 2 U.S.C. § 441d (2011).
18 Courts and others have often been criticized for failing to fully examine and develop
the theoretical underpinnings of disclosure laws and their constitutionality. See Anthony John-
stone, A Madisonian Case for Disclosure, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 414, 416 (2012) (noting the
Citizens United Court’s fairly cursory treatment of the informational interest and stating that
“[c]ampaign finance disclosure needs a more robust constitutional foundation than it has”).
19 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66–68 (1976) (listing three purposes of disclosure
provisions in FECA).
20 For example, one commentator has found that increased disclosure can lead to more
news articles about political money, resulting in fewer shallow “horserace” stories.  Raymond
La Raja, Sunshine Laws and the Press: The Effect of Campaign Disclosure on News Reporting
in the American States, 6 ELEC. L.J. 236, 247 (2007) (noting that “evidence that better disclo-
sure regimes encourage reporters to avoid the tried–and–true horserace story” is “potentially
good news for civic life”).  Disclosure of campaign finance data also provides invaluable data
through which scholars can analyze political issues. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures
About Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255, 258 (2010) (stating that “facilitating the study and
knowledge of political behavior” is an additional reason for campaign finance disclosure).
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Amendment-protected speech in elections.21  Justice Kennedy explained
that “[w]ith the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures
can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to
hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and
supporters.”22  He further explained that “transparency enables the elec-
torate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different
speakers and messages.”23  Though most see this as a venerable and per-
haps necessary facet of democracy, especially considering deregulation
of election spending, Justice Thomas voiced his disagreement with the
idea that the informational interest is sufficient to require speakers to
disclose their identities.24
Those who support upholding disclosure laws based on the informa-
tional interest claim that disclosure of the identity of a candidate’s sup-
porters provides a valuable “heuristic cue” for voters.25  The most
common heuristic cue in the voting context is party affiliation—if a voter
knows little or nothing about a candidate, they may vote based on party
affiliation, and often will arrive at the same decision they would have
had they known everything about a candidate’s platform.26  The same
logic applies to disclosure of a candidate’s (or a ballot measure’s) sup-
porters and opponents: Voters who possess information about the donor
(such as the NRA or the Sierra Club) can use that information to fill the
gaps in their knowledge, leading them to vote a certain way.
Providing voters with information with which they can assess their
representatives and other government officials is invaluable because it
can affect voters’ choices.  However, perhaps just as importantly, candi-
dates’ actions will be affected by what they know they will be forced to
disclose.  Thus, a principal benefit of successful disclosure regimes is the
behavioral effects they engender.27  This benefit is typically said to pre-
21 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.at 980 (“The disclosure, disclaimer, and reporting requirements in BCRA §§ 201
and 311 are also unconstitutional.”).
25 A heuristic cue is essentially a shortcut that allows someone with incomplete informa-
tion to arrive at the same answer they would have regardless of whether or not they possessed
all necessary information.  See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Re-
storing Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus”, 50 UCLA L. REV.
1141, 1149 (2003).
26 Id. at 1150.
27 See La Raja, supra note 20, at 239–40 (explaining that “politicians might alter their R
behavior when they know it is easier for others to keep track of their campaign finances” and
“such adaptive behavior by politicians is precisely what many political reformers sought by
improving disclosure”). See also FUNG ET AL., supra note 10, at 40 (explaining that R
“[t]argeted transparency policies” aim to alter disclosers’ behavior “in specified ways”).  For
more information on a view that a disclosure–only system is preferable to one with spending
and/or contribution limits, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998
UTAH L. REV. 311, 326 (1998).  Under a disclosure–only system, voters serve as the judges of
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vent corruption because “the light of publicity . . . . may discourage those
who would use money for improper purposes either before or after the
election.”28  Naturally, however, disclosure’s effect on an official’s be-
havior will not stop at discouraging the narrow quid pro quo definition of
corruption promulgated by the current Supreme Court—the effect it may
have on officials’ behavior can extend to actions that might demonstrate
“undue influence”29 of a financial supporter or otherwise garner a nega-
tive reaction from the official’s constituency.  For example, mandated
disclosure can cause candidates and incumbents to shy away from solicit-
ing money from entities with whom they may not want to associate, or
may cause them to return money from certain undesirable donors.30  Fur-
ther, it may encourage government officials to avoid allowing their fi-
nancial supporters to exert undue influence on their decision-making, or
even appearing to exert such influence.31  Requiring disclosure of how
legislators spend their time may have a similar effect to the anticorrup-
tion interest by encouraging them to make fewer fundraising calls and
focus more time on legislative work.
what constitutes undue influence and thus are the most desirable watchdog that can be used to
change behavior of political actors.
28 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976). See generally, Burroughs v. United States,
290 U.S. 534 (1934); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).  Anthony John-
stone, author of A Madisonian Case for Disclosure, noted how the Buckley Court’s repetition
of a quoted phrase from Grosjean v. American Press Co., “informed public opinion is the most
potent of all restraints on misgovernment,” helps align disclosure with the First Amendment,
because the press is relied upon in order to inform the public. See Johnstone, supra note 18, at R
437.
29 As recently as 2001, the Court described corruption as “not only quid pro quo agree-
ments, but also as undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such
influence.”  Fed. Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S.
431, 441 (2001).  However, the Court in Citizens United clarified that the majority of the Court
will now hold to the narrowest definition, which essentially means only bribery.  Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 908 (2010).
30 There are numerous examples.  In February 2012, Barack Obama’s campaign returned
over $200,000 in donations bundled by brothers of a fugitive linked to violence in Mexico.
See Obama Campaign Returns $200,000 Donation from Fugitive’s Family, THE GUARDIAN
(Feb. 7, 2012, 6:54 EST), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/07/obama-campaign-do-
nation-fugitive-family.  Interest groups also often pressure candidates to reject or return contri-
butions from sources inimical to their interest.  Presidential candidate Mitt Romney faced
negative commentary when he failed to return donations from Daniel Staton, the chairman of a
company that owns Penthouse magazine and several pornographic websites. See Adam Peck,
Romney Signs Anti–Porn Pledge, Ignores Demand to Return Contribution from ‘Hardcore’
Pornographer, THINK PROGRESS, (Feb. 15, 2012, 5:27 PM) http://thinkprogress.org/politics/
2012/02/15/426391/ romney-anti-porn-pledge-ignores-contribution-pornographer/?mobile=nc.
31 See, e.g., Krishnakumar, supra note 6, at 541 (“The threat of [exposure of a legisla-
tor’s meetings with lobbyists], could encourage (or force) elected officials, or at least their
staffs, to split their dance cards more evenly between opposing interests for fear of how it will
look to the electorate, and other interest groups, if lobbying disclosures reveal them to be
unduly partial to one set of interests.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\23-1\CJP101.txt unknown Seq: 10  8-NOV-13 11:55
10 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 23:1
Finally, disclosure of contributions and expenditures is necessary in
order to enforce any limits on monetary outlays.  Of course, after Citi-
zens United, expenditure limits are unconstitutional for individuals, do-
mestic corporations and labor unions,32 but contribution limits can only
be policed if contributions are reported.  One could argue that reporting
requirements to government agencies (and not the public) would suffi-
ciently serve this purpose,33 though public disclosure could conceivably
allow members of the general electorate to assist in detecting unlawful
activity or violation of other campaign finance laws.
The following Part will discuss why the current disclosure laws are
not completely fulfilling the intended purposes for which they were
passed.  First, however, it will take a broader look at campaign finance
laws in order to provide background and demonstrate how disclosure
laws fit into the campaign finance framework.
II. THE CURRENT LAW AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS
A. The Long, Winding Road from Watergate
The modern effort to regulate money in politics began in the wake
of the Watergate scandal.  Congress originally passed FECA in 1971, but
amended it heavily in 1974.  Corporate contributions had long been
banned, but the FECA amendments attempted to get to the root of cam-
paign finance problems by setting limits on contributions to candidates,
independent expenditures, and total spending by candidates and cam-
paigns.34  FECA also required disclosure of certain contributions and ex-
penditures, created an enforcement body (the Federal Election
Commission), and created a public financing system for presidential
campaigns.35
The law was torn apart by the Supreme Court in the seminal cam-
paign finance case, Buckley v. Valeo.36  Most critically, the Court placed
32 Currently expenditure limits still exist for foreign entities, see Bluman v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012) (affirming district court’s dismissal of case seeking to invali-
date ban on contributions and expenditures), but commentators have noted the doctrinal inco-
herence of allowing such limits while banning limits on domestic corporate speech on a
listener-oriented foundation.  Richard Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence,
109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 584 (2011) (“For example, it is unclear how, if the Court took its own
broad pronouncements in Citizens United seriously, it could possibly sustain spending limits
against foreign nationals and governments, who might seek to flood U.S. election campaigns
with money.”).
33 Mayer, supra note 20, at 258. R
34 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7 (1976).
35 Id. Though FECA’s purposes varied, its principal goal was “the prevention of corrup-
tion and the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of
large financial contributions on candidates’ positions and on their actions if elected to office.”
Id. at 25.
36 Id.
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campaign finance regulations squarely within the First Amendment arena
by deciding that spending money qualifies as speaking for constitutional
purposes.  The Court struck down the law’s limits on independent spend-
ing and did away with limits on a candidate’s personal contributions and
limits on total campaign spending.37  However, the justices upheld the
law’s contribution limits, reasoning that contributions were more sym-
bolic than expenditures, and thus could be constitutionally limited (but
not banned).38  The Court also upheld the optional public financing sys-
tem for presidential campaigns.39  As for FECA’s disclosure provisions,
the Court recognized their constitutionality but construed the section of
the law requiring disclosure of the source of independent expenditures
narrowly to avoid vagueness problems.  Thus, FECA was interpreted to
require disclosure of independent spending only when the communica-
tions at issue “expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly iden-
tified candidate.”40  This gave birth to the de facto “magic words”
requirement, which required disclosure only for independent expendi-
tures that used words such as “vote for,” “vote against,” and “elect.”41
Thus, after Buckley, those seeking to avoid disclosure of their indepen-
dent spending could do so by avoiding use of such words, even though
the content of the communication at issue clearly was intended to influ-
ence an election.42
The law has developed within Buckley’s framework for the past
thirty-five years.  Congress enacted significant amendments to the sys-
tem in 2002 when it passed BCRA (also known as McCain-Feingold).
BCRA instituted several major changes to the law: it banned the use of
“soft money”—money not regulated by federal campaign finance law—
by national parties, who had for years been skirting FECA by raising
money for purposes such as party-building activities and using it to fund
issue advertisements.43  The other major change was a ban on corporate
and union funding of electioneering communications.44  BCRA also in-
stituted disclosure requirements for electioneering communications, re-
quiring disclosure of independent expenditures that did not contain the
“magic words” set forth in Buckley.
37 Id. at 51, 54, 58.
38 Id. at 20-21, 29.
39 Id. at 86.
40 Id. at 80.
41 Id. at 44 n.52; Ciara Torres–Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the Tax Code, the Dark Election
of 2010 and Why Tax–Exempt Entities Should Be Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Fi-
nance Disclosure Laws, 16 NEXUS: CHAP. J.L. & POL’Y 59, 66 (2011) (explaining magic
words requirement stemming from Buckley).
42 Id.  Such advertisements are often called “sham issue ads.”
43 John McCain, Reclaiming Our Democracy: The Way Forward, 3 ELECT. L.J. 115, 117
(2004).
44 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i); § 441b(b)(2) (2011).
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Though BCRA was initially upheld by the Supreme Court in Mc-
Connell v. FEC,45 its efficacy was largely stripped shortly thereafter,46
and the house of cards came down with Citizens United in 2010.  As a
result, corporations and unions now can spend unlimited amounts of
money from their general treasury funds on speech that is not coordi-
nated with a candidate.  And due to several subsequent lower court deci-
sions, the government also may not limit any contributions to PACs that
only make independent expenditures.47  Such PACs, now known as
Super PACs, began to emerge in the 2010 midterm elections and are
playing an increasingly dominant role in federal elections.48
However, federal disclosure requirements have remained relatively
unscathed. Citizens United rejected the argument that disclosure could
only be constitutionally required of communications that are the func-
tional equivalent of express advocacy, leaving BCRA’s disclosure re-
quirements for electioneering communications intact.49  As the
remaining subsections in this Part will explain, however, disclosure laws
are not without their own problems: many donors successfully avoid dis-
closure, it is unclear how well the public is able to use the information
they are provided, and there are serious concerns that disclosure laws
chill political speech and invade privacy.
These concerns notwithstanding, most have concluded that disclo-
sure laws are a healthy addition to our democracy.  However, reformers
are under no false impression that even the best imaginable system of
disclosure fills the void for the spending limits or robust public financing
they desire.  Disclosure of spending cannot directly prevent quid pro quo
corruption.  It is also unlikely that current disclosure laws will do much
to check the much more common and amorphous problem of distortion,
in which money can buy access to legislators, assistance on issues dear to
45 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
46 See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007). Wiscon-
sin Right to Life upheld the ban on corporate and union electioneering communications, but
only for advertisements that were the “functional equivalent” of express advocacy. Id. at 457.
47 Wisconsin Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Barland, 664 F.3d 139, 154
(7th Cir. 2011); Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d
684, 687 (9th Cir. 2010); SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir.
2010).  The Fourth Circuit actually reached this issue before Citizens United and came to the
same conclusion after reviewing a North Carolina law.  N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525
F.3d 274, 293 (4th Cir. 2008).  Until SpeechNow, federal law limited individual contributions
to PACs to $5,000 per year.  Before Super PACs were authorized by these cases, individuals
could spend unlimited amounts of their own money on independent expenditures, but were
limited in their donations to PACs. SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 691.
48 In the 2012 election, at least $630 million was spent by Super PACs, which amounted
to roughly half of spending by outside groups in that election.  Center for Responsive Politics,
Outside Spending, OPEN SECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/index.php (last
visited Oct. 3, 2013).
49 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 915 (2010).
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donors, and support for issues that are relatively minor and do not often
catch the public eye.50  Further, there is no reason to believe that re-
vealing the identity of political spenders significantly reduces the pub-
lic’s mistrust of a government financed by wealthy backers,51 as
expenditure limits might.
Most importantly for purposes of this Article, disclosure in its cur-
rent form does not have an appreciable effect on the overwhelming bur-
den shouldered by legislators as a result of the de facto mandate that they
constantly raise money.52  As discussed in more detail below, many leg-
islators have expressed immeasurable frustration at the current system,
which in essence requires a member of Congress to have the “heart of a
telemarketer.”53  The never-ending money race has been called the “most
obvious[ ]” deleterious effect of  the current system, and results in mem-
bers of Congress spending between thirty and seventy percent of their
time raising money.54
B. Avoidance of Disclosure Requirements
Aside from the limits inherent in disclosure provisions discussed in
the previous subsection, the current state of the law allows many people
and entities to avoid public scrutiny by spending dark money, which is
money that comes from undisclosed sources.  Seen in the most positive
light, the shortcomings that allow dark money are significant problems
that need to be overcome; in the worst, they mean that “disclosure failed
colossally in the 2010 election.”55  According to the Center for Respon-
50 LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS – AND A
PLAN TO STOP IT 124–143 (2011).  Distortion can be caused in part by lobbyists, who often
gain access to legislators through contributions and “bundling,” or collecting contributions
from many different people. See, e.g., Richard Hasen, Lobbying, Rent Seeking, and the Con-
stitution, 64 STANFORD L. REV. 191, 205 (2012) (noting concerns that bundling by lobbyists
can “enhance the lobbyist’s stature” with legislators and help them gain influence).  Concerns
about distortion are widespread, and can come from those of all political stripes.  For example,
Sarah Palin once lamented that “the big players who can afford lobbyists work the regulations
in their favor, while their smaller competitors are left out in the cold.” Id. at 194 (quoting
Sarah Palin, “Institutionalizing Crony Capitalism,” Facebook, Apr. 24, 2010, available at
http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=382303098434).
51 LESSIG, supra note 50, at 167 (reporting poll in which 79% of respondents believed
that “members of Congress are ‘controlled’ by the groups and people who finance their
campaigns”).
52 Id. at 121.
53 Michael Leahy, Washington Post, House Rules, June 10, 2007, at http://www.washing
tonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/05/AR2007060501702.html (quoting Connecticut
Representative Joe Courtney, who described placing calls from the Democratic party’s phone
bank “leaving hundreds of messages a day” with donors).
54 Id.
55 William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Persona: Bringing Privacy Theory to Election
Law, 19 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 859, 864 (2011) (explaining how the rules in place led to
disclosure of small donations, but allowed Karl Rove’s 501(c)(4) group Crossroads GPS raised
$43 million from undisclosed donors). See also Johnstone, supra note 18, at 420 (commenting
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sive Politics, the percentage of spending that came from groups not re-
quired to disclose their donors rose from one percent in the 2006
midterm elections to forty-seven percent in the 2010 midterms.56  The
trend continued during the 2012 election, in which expenditures by dark
money groups surpassed the $300 million mark and amounted to about
one quarter of all outside spending.57  The system’s failures have been
the subject of much disagreement in the years following Citizens United.
As a result of the success spenders have had in avoiding meaningful dis-
closure, many have characterized the Citizens United Court’s seeming
reliance on disclosure provisions as naı¨ve.58
Avoidance of disclosure requirements is not a new phenomenon.
For some time, those seeking to influence elections without disclosing
their identity could donate to “527 organizations,” which are groups reg-
istered under section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code.59  The code sec-
tion was created in the aftermath of Watergate, but began to serve as a
major vehicle for veiled political spending in the 1990s.60  The organiza-
tions were originally especially attractive to political actors because they
did not require disclosure of donors and they are not limited in any way
from attempting to affect elections.61  However, in 2000 Congress passed
a law requiring disclosure of contributions to and expenditures of 527s.62
Despite passage of the disclosure requirement, 527s still played a large
on loopholes in the current regime); Torres–Spelliscy, supra note 41, at 66 (referring to 2010
mid–term election as a “Dark Election” because of disclosure avoidance).
56 Spencer MacColl, Citizens United Decision Profoundly Affects Political Landscape
(May 5, 2011), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/05/citizens-united-decision-profound
ly-affects-political-landscape.html.
57 Center for Responsive Politics, 2012 Outside Spending, by Groups: Nondisclosing
Groups, OPEN SECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&
chrt=V&disp=O&type=U (last visited Mar. 14, 2013); Center for Responsive Politics, 2012
Outside Spending, by Groups: All Groups, OPEN SECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/outside
spending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&disp=O&type=A (last visited Mar. 14, 2013).
58 See Richard Hasen, Justice Kennedy’s Mistaken Citizens United Vision and the Lurch
Toward Campaign Finance Deregulation, ACS BLOG, (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/
acsblog/justice-kennedy%E2%80%99s-mistaken-citizens-united-vision-and-the-lurch-toward-
campaign-finance-dere (“Justice Kennedy’s utopian information–flowing vision of the U.S.
campaign finance system is now no more than a dream; the question is just how bad things
will become in the 2012 election season.”).
59 The organizations are exempt from paying federal income tax and can spend unlimited
amounts of money to influence elections.  They were exceedingly popular in the 2004 presi-
dential campaign; well–known organizations such as Swift Boat Veterans and POWs were 527
groups.
60 Craig Holman, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act: Limits and Opportunities for
Non–Profit Groups in Federal Elections, 31 N. KY. L. REV. 243, 266 (2004) (“Section 527s
became known as ‘Stealth PACs’ and mushroomed in number and spending activity in the
mid–1990s.”).
61 Paul S. Ryan, 527s in 2008:  The Past, Present, and Future of 527 Organization Polit-
ical Activity Regulation, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 471, 481 (2008).
62 Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign Disclo-
sure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELEC. L.J. 295, 318 (2005).
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role in elections after 2000, notably in 2004 with well-known ads such as
the “Swift Boat” attacks on John Kerry.63
Recently, anonymity-seeking actors have turned to section 501(c) of
the tax code, most commonly 501(c)(4).64  While Super PACs must dis-
close their donors because they are political committees, 501(c)(4)
groups are “social welfare organizations,” and therefore need not dis-
close donors if they are not primarily engaged in electoral politics.65
These groups gained popularity in the 2010 midterm elections, spending
millions of undisclosed dollars.  While 501(c)(4) has long been an option
for political activity, it became a much more attractive choice after (1)
Citizens United allowed spending of corporate money from general trea-
sury funds and (2) subsequent cases, such as SpeechNow.org v. FEC,
held that Congress could not limit the amount of money contributed to a
group that makes only independent expenditures.66  Perhaps most notable
was Karl Rove’s Crossroads GPS, the 501(c)(4) sister to Rove’s Super
PAC, which spent $70 million on the 2012 election cycle.67  Of the $484
million in outside money spent on the 2010 election cycle, $132.1 mil-
lion was funneled through nondisclosing organizations, most registered
as 501(c)(4)s.68
As discussed above, entities that do not qualify as political commit-
tees can often avoid disclosure requirements even when much of their
activity is aimed at influencing elections.  Another federal law requires
disclosure of contributions of over $1,000 to groups that make indepen-
dent expenditures or electioneering communications regardless of
63 Swift Boat Veterans and POWs for Truth was later found to have violated campaign
finance laws by failing to register as a political committee, with a “major purpose” of influenc-
ing elections.  Ryan, supra note 61, at 493. R
64 Briffault, Two Challenges, supra note 14, at 1007.  Some political organizations are R
also set up under 501(c)(6) of the tax code, which is used for trade associations or chambers of
commerce.
65 Section 501(c) organizations must be “primarily engaged in promoting the mission
that is the basis of their respective exemptions.”  Miriam Galston, When Statutory Regimes
Collide: Will Citizens United and Wisconsin Right to Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of
Campaign Activity Unconstitutional?, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 867, 876 (2011).  However, there
is no accepted standard in the current law, which creates significant uncertainty and contro-
versy. Id. at 876 n. 29.
66 SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Citizens
United provided the reasoning for the D.C. Circuit to strike down provisions limiting contribu-
tions to independent expenditure–only organizations, giving rise to the infamous Super PAC.
However, the Fourth Circuit had previously come to the same conclusion in NC Right to Life,
Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 308 (4th Cir. 2008).
67 Center for Responsive Politics, American Crossroads/Crossroads GPS, OPEN
SECRETS, available at http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/detail.php?cmte=American
+Crossroads%2FCrossroads+GPS&cycle=2012 (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
68 Center for Responsive Politics, 2010 Outside Spending, by Groups, OPEN SECRETS,
available at http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2010&chrt=D&
disp=O&type=A (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
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whether the group is a political committee, but the FEC  created a gaping
loophole when it decided by a 3-2 vote that the law should only apply to
donors that earmark their donations for a specific electioneering commu-
nication or independent expenditure.69  If the funds are donated generally
to the organization, no disclosure is required.70  In an unsurprising shift,
donors to such organizations were less keen on earmarking their contri-
butions after that decision.71
Thus, aside from the limited usefulness of disclosure, the current
state of the law allows many of the country’s biggest spenders to remain
out of the public eye.  Closing current loopholes would ameliorate the
problem to some degree and would be vital to improve the efficacy of a
more comprehensive legislator-based disclosure law discussed below.
C. Limited Usefulness for Voters
Another limitation of current disclosure provisions is that, even if
they were able to track all of the money spent in support of certain candi-
dates, there are myriad unanswered questions about how effective the
information is for voters and how best to present and distribute data.
As mentioned in Part I, information about a candidate’s financial
backing is often said to serve as a heuristic cue for voters—because they
are not perfectly informed, disclosure about campaign financing can help
voters come to the same conclusion they would if they knew all there
was to know about a candidate.  Party affiliation is also a heuristic cue
and is clearly much more widely used than campaign finance data.  Be-
cause of the existence of other cues, is not clear that cues disclosing a
candidate’s funding sources are sufficient to make a significant differ-
ence for many voters,72 perhaps principally because of the volume of
69 11 C.F.R. s. 104.20(c)(9) (2010) (requiring disclosure of donations “made for the pur-
pose of furthering electioneering communications”); 11 C.F.R. s. 109.10(e)(1)(vi) (2010)
(same for those “made for the purpose of furthering the reported independent expenditure”).
70 In the Matter of Freedom’s Watch, Fed. Elec. Comm’n MUR 6002, available at http://
eqs.nictusa.com/eqsdocsMUR/10044274536.pdf; Briffault, Two Challenges, supra note 14, at R
1008–09.
This rule may change in the near future.  In Van Hollen v. Fed. Election Comm’n, the District
Court for the District of Columbia struck down the FEC’s regulation as to electioneering com-
munications under the Administrative Procedure Act, holding that the FEC undertook a poli-
cymaking function outside the scope of its authority under the Chevron test.  851 F.Supp.2d
69, 89 (D.D.C. 2012). According to the court, the FEC was not allowed to rewrite the disclo-
sure rules in response to new Supreme Court precedent. Id.  That decision was reversed and
remanded by the D.C. Circuit to allow the FEC to determine whether to engage in a rulemak-
ing and, if not, for the District Court to apply the second step of the Chevron test.  Ctr. for
Individual Freedom v. Van Hollen, 694 F.3d 108, 112 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
71 Nicholas Bamman, Campaign Finance: Public Funding After Bennett, 27 J.L. &
POL’Y 323, 329 (2012) (noting that as a result of this decision, “statistics reveal a precipitous
drop in independent expenditure disclosures over the past several years”).
72 Mayer, supra note 20, at 265 (stating possibility that heuristic cues from disclosure R
create no new information on top of preexisting cues of party affiliation and endorsement).
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data and the lack of clear evidence of corruption or influence between
legislators and their funders.73  It is especially unlikely that voters use
data about small donors.  As discussed in more detail in Part III.A.1,
Michael Kang has argued (in the context of disclosure about financial
supporters of ballot measures) that the limited use of this data should
lead us to institute a system that focuses on disclosure of larger donors
and effective distribution of that information.74
Assuming that knowledge concerning campaign spending is mean-
ingful once it reaches voters, it remains unclear how widely the informa-
tion is spread.  It is unlikely that many voters look at lists of campaign
contributors or spenders.  Thus, it is the responsibility of the press and
other independent outlets to report the relevant data in the manner best
suited for use at the ballot box.  Though the press serves this function to
some extent, its role is shaped by other considerations, such as attempt-
ing to attract readers and by remaining objective.75  Even nonprofit orga-
nizations dedicated to reporting political data may distort information to
serve their own agenda.76  And removing the concern of bias, it is simply
difficult to design a system that will be the most efficacious for end
users.77
Negative information about a candidate’s financial backers often will not trump other cues
such as party affiliation, even if voters are aware of that information.  For example, Senator
Kirsten Gillibrand was one of the only Democrats to accept donations from tobacco companies
in her 2008 congressional election, but won that election and also won her 2010 senate election
against a Republican challenger that attacked her based on past legal work for Phillip Morris.
Deniz Baykan, Client List Disclosure: Ethical Dilemma or Politically Motivated Excuse, 24
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 443, 448 (2011).  Of course, it is extremely difficult to discern the cues
that would sway voters, given the multitude of factors that go into a voting decision.
73 Corruption is notoriously difficult to define and prove. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning,
Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of International Corruption Conventions and
United States Law, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 793, 803 (2001) (“Adding to the difficulty in
defining corruption is the absence of reliable measures of its pervasiveness beyond general
perceptions that a government or ministry is corrupt.  Relying solely on conduct that consti-
tutes a criminal violation would not demonstrate whether corruption is rampant because the
misconduct is so difficult to detect that conviction rates provide little insight into the scope of
the problem.”).
74 Kang, supra note 25, at 1179.
75 Mayer, supra note 20, at 267; see also FUNG ET AL., supra note 10, at 42, explaining R
shortcomings of disclosure regimes (such as FECA) that fail to specify intended users of the
information, and noting that while this can make policies more flexible to change, it can “keep
policymakers from assuring that policies are designed for easy use by diverse audiences.”
Thus, potential users of the information contained in campaign finance disclosure are often
dependent on nonprofit groups or the press to aggregate data.  Though coverage of campaign
finance is limited, there is evidence that more comprehensive disclosure regimes lead to at
least marginally better press reporting and greater access to data.  La Raja, supra note 20, at
246–47 (reporting results of study that showed newspapers print “relatively few articles about
campaign finance”).
76 Mayer, supra note 20, at 268–69. R
77 CRAIG HOLMAN & WILLIAM LUNEBERG, LOBBYING AND TRANSPARENCY: A COMPARA-
TIVE ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY REFORM 1–30 (2012) (noting, in the lobbying context, the
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Other details add to the general problems of voter awareness and
reporting of disclosed data.  For example, political committees them-
selves make the choice of how to report expenditures, meaning that simi-
lar expenditures may be reported inconsistently from different groups.78
The timing of mandated disclosures can vary, preventing effective and
immediate dissemination of the information.79  Further, the public is
likely generally uninformed about the intricacies of disclosure laws, in-
hibiting them from appropriately assessing information they are pro-
vided.  As Bauerly and Hallstrom explain, “voters may not realize that
their access to the information the Supreme Court says they are entitled
to varies drastically depending on the type of speaker they are hearing.”80
Similarly, voters may often assume certain advertisements are campaign
ads (and thus subject to the legal restrictions of FECA or BCRA) when
they are not.81  This voter confusion prevents current disclosure laws
from fully achieving their purpose: Voters that are misinformed cannot
accurately assess speech in the manner intended.
D. The Chilling Effect and Privacy Concerns
For the most part, federal courts have upheld the disclosure laws
discussed in this Article in the face of arguments that they chill political
speech.  As mentioned above, Citizens United envisioned a world in
which both individuals and corporations could spend as much they
pleased, but their spending would be disclosed and easily accessible on
the Internet.82  Only Justice Thomas would have struck down BCRA’s
disclosure provisions as facially unconstitutional.83  Yet Citizens United,
like cases preceding it, left open the possibility for as-applied challenges
to disclosure provisions if donors were likely to be threatened by harass-
“challenges of arranging the contents of databases and designing search engines in such a way
as to maximize the ability to conduct carefully tailored comprehensive, comparative and spe-
cially targeted searches”).
78 Bauerly & Hallstrom, supra note 3, at 356.
79 See, e.g., Dan Glaun, Stealthy Super PACs Influenced Primaries without Disclosing
Donors, OPEN SECRETS BLOG  (July 2, 2012) http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/07/
stealthy-super-pacs-influenced-prim.html (explaining the existence of “a period of 20 days
before the primary election, during which [Super PACs] can take in and spend money without
disclosing [their] donors until the next quarterly filing”).  For example, the group Conserva-
tives Acting Together PAC reported having only $25 cash on hand but made a nearly $100,000
expenditure just one day later, still within the window of time in which spending did not need
to be immediately disclosed. Id.
80 Bauerly & Hallstrom, supra note 3, at 357.
81 Id.at 357-58.
82 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010) (“With the
advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens
with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their
positions and supporters.”).
83 Id. at 980.
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ment or retaliation.84  The Court reaffirmed the same principle later the
same term in Doe v. Reed, a case challenging a Washington law allowing
public access to the names of those signing petitions for a ballot
measure.85
Increasingly, opponents of broad disclosure requirements have tried
to ensure that Citizens United and Doe v. Reed are not the last word on
the constitutionality of disclosure provisions by emphasizing the threat of
harassment and intimidation caused by disclosure and arguing that dis-
closure (especially of the identity of donors of small amounts) has little
or no benefit.86  Perhaps because of reform opponents’ recent success,
talk has increasingly turned from the inefficacy or unconstitutionality of
spending and contribution restrictions to the possible chilling effect that
occurs when donors are required to reveal personal information.87  How-
ever, it is not only opponents of reform that have cautioned about poten-
tial negative effects of disclosure laws; in the past several years,
prominent scholars have increasingly questioned both low-dollar disclo-
sure thresholds and courts’ sometimes crabbed view of disclosure laws’
potential to chill speech.88
The issue was perhaps most prominent in the national news when
there were reports of incidents of violence and intimidation against those
supporting California’s Proposition 8, which banned gay marriage in the
84 See id. at 916.
85 The ballot measure in question concerned a law passed by the legislature that granted
same-sex couples the same rights as heterosexual couples (without conferring the “marriage”
title to their relationships).  Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2816 (2010).  But the court’s deci-
sion applied to the disclosure law generally, not specifically as applied to this ballot measure.
Id. at 2820–21.  The court emphasized disclosure’s ability to “help cure the inadequacies of the
verification and canvassing processes” and prevent fraud. Id. at 2820.  It also once again
reaffirmed the availability of narrower challenges. Id. at 2821.
86 See, e.g., Dale E. Ho, NAACP v. Alabama and False Symmetry in the Disclosure
Debate, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.& PUB. POL’Y 405, 406 (2012) (“In the wake of Citizens United v.
FEC, the legal fight over campaign finance has largely shifted from direct limits on expendi-
tures to disclosure requirements.”); Bopp & Haynie, supra note 4, at 21 (“Political Exposure
Laws Do Not Prevent Anyone from Speaking in the Same Way that Jewish Armbands Did Not
Prevent Anyone from Practicing Their Religion.”).
87 See, e.g., Hiatt, supra note 1; Will Evans, Public Disclosure is Next Frontier in Cam-
paign Finance Reform, CALIFORNIA WATCH (Apr. 20, 2012) http://californiawatch.org/
dailyreport/public-disclosure-next-frontier-campaign-finance-reform-15848 (“After recent
court rulings struck down significant campaign finance limits, the next frontier in the debate
over money in politics appears to be public disclosure—whether there should be more or less
of it.”).
88 See, e.g., McGeveran, supra note 55, at 862-64 (urging courts to reevaluate typical R
disclosure doctrine due to developments such as ease of access to information online); Brif-
fault, Disclosure 2.0, supra note 13, at 276 (“In light of the limited benefit of disclosure and R
the potential burden on political participation that can result from it, disclosure thresholds
ought generally to be raised not lowered, so that only major political players are targeted and
the political privacy of smaller participants in the campaign finance process is better
protected.”).
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state.89  In one instance, news broke that the artistic director of the Cali-
fornia Musical Theatre had given $1,000 to support the ban.  The story
“popped up on web sites following the passage of Proposition 8.”90  A
short time later, the director resigned because of the public outcry sur-
rounding the revelation.91
More recently, commentators have become concerned with other in-
cidents that may discourage speech.  Some have pointed out the negative
effects created by boycotts led by those who disagree with certain politi-
cal spending.  Most notable was a boycott of companies that contributed
to the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), which promoted
implementation of voter identification laws.92  Former FEC Chairman
Bradley Smith has argued that the threat of secondary boycotts “provides
a strong rationale for limiting the scope of compulsory disclosure of po-
litical speech, contributions, and activities.”93
Perhaps even more fiery was the recent debate concerning the
“naming and assailing” of those who have donated heavily to Super
PACs.  When an Obama campaign website called “Keeping GOP Hon-
est” named and criticized certain donors to Mitt Romney’s Super PAC,
Restore Our Future, there was a general uproar accusing the President
and his administration of intimidating the opposition.94  In particular,
some complained about the treatment of Frank VanderSloot, a wealthy
Idaho businessman and national finance co-chairman for Romney.95
VanderSloot gave $1 million to Restore Our Future, and was “smeared
particularly as being ‘litigious, combative and a bitter foe of the gay
rights movement’” by the Obama campaign.96  Commentators have com-
plained about this treatment, reporting that VanderSloot’s children were
even “harassed.”97  VanderSloot himself stated that the “public beatings”
89 See Bopp & Haynie, supra note 86, at 22 (calling intimidators of Proposition 8 sup- R
porters a “modern–day mob”).
90 Jesse McKinley, Theater Director Resigns Amid Gay-Rights Ire, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
2008, at C1. See also Shane Goldmacher, Mormon Church Reveals Deeper Involvement in
California’s Proposition 8, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 1, 2009 at A3 (discussing California Musi-
cal Theatre story and noting that “[t]here were similar cases elsewhere in the state”).
91 McKinley, supra note 90. R
92 See Bradley Smith, The Problematic Nature of Secondary Boycotts on Political
Speech, CENTER FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.campaignfreedom
.org/2012/04/20/the-problematic-nature-of-secondary-boycotts-on-political-speech/.
93 Id.
94 See, e.g., Kimberly A. Strassel, Trolling for Dirt on the President’s List, WALL ST. J.
(May 10, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230407030457739641
2560038208.html (stating that “the president of the United States publicly target[ed] a private
citizen for the crime of supporting his opponent”).
95 Kenneth P. Vogel, Mega–Donors: Quit Picking on Us, POLITICO (May 31, 2012),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0512/76899.html.
96 Strassel, supra note 94. R
97 Id. See also CEO Frank VanderSloot Fights Back Against Obama Campaign and
Defends His Romney Donation By Writing Another Check, FOX NEWS INSIDER (May 14,
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would not deter him from making further donations,98 though it did cause
his company, which sells wellness products, to lose business from “a
couple hundred customers.”99
Though the levels of alarm in reaction to such events differ amongst
those in the campaign finance field, even proponents of disclosure have
advocated that in response to these occurrences, disclosure thresholds
should be high enough so as not to require public disclosure of personal
data for relatively low-level donors.100  As discussed in Part III.A.3 be-
low, simple disclosure of legislators’ time spent fundraising carries no
threat of chilling speech or causing privacy concerns for donors.
* * *
Critically, disclosure requirements that are incomplete or avoidable
can sometimes be harmful to the political process.101  While few disclo-
sure proponents would argue that the existing regime is outright harmful,
it distorts the proper focus by failing to include all actors within its
scope.  The public is given incomplete information, affecting voters’
ability to make decisions based on disclosure of fundraising and spend-
ing data.  Further, it creates a larger burden for those complying with the
spirit of the law.  And perhaps most importantly, rife with loopholes, it
fails to have the desired behavioral consequences for those raising and
spending money.
III. LEGISLATOR DISCLOSURE OF FUNDRAISING TIME
A. Benefits of Legislator Disclosure
Disclosure regimes are inherently limited in their effectiveness be-
cause they do not restrict any action, and problems with current federal
law exacerbate the system’s inherent shortcomings.  As many have al-
ready argued, loopholes should be closed and the current system should
be modified in order to ensure our democracy benefits as much as possi-
ble from fundraising disclosure.
Yet other steps can be taken to improve disclosure results without
violating the Constitution, a problem that burdens many campaign fi-
2012), http://foxnewsinsider.com/2012/05/14/ceo-frank-vandersloot-fights-back-against-
obama-campaign-and-defends-his-romney-donation-by-writing-another-check/ (reporting that
Bill O’Reilly called attacks on VanderSloot “political terrorism”) [hereinafter Vandersloot
Fights Back].
98 Strassel, supra note 94. R
99 VanderSloot Fights Back, supra note 95.
100 See, e.g., McGeveran, supra note 55, at 881; Briffault, Disclosure 2.0, supra note 13, R
at 300-01 (discussing wisdom of raising disclosure thresholds).
101 See McGeveran, supra note 55, at 864 (arguing that in 2010, disclosure rules “reached R
their absurd climax, exposing numerous instances of small-scale citizen participation but con-
cealing the giant influence of financially and politically powerful entities”).
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nance reform attempts.  First and most simply, candidates and incum-
bents should be required to report the number of hours they spend
soliciting money—both contributions and independent expenditures.102
While anecdotal evidence demonstrates that the time legislators spend
fundraising is shocking, there is no indication that the public is aware of
the extent of the problem, much less the amount of time their own repre-
sentatives spend asking for money.  The electorate must know how much
time its representatives spend raising money in order to most effectively
use information about fundraising and influence the behavior of elected
officials.  Preferably, the law would require disclosure of the fundraising
method as well: legislators would have to report the amount of time they
spent making telephone calls to potential donors, the time they spent at
in-person fundraisers, and so on.  The details contained in such reporting
would provide constituents with an idea of how their representatives
spend a typical day.
While some policies demonstrate recognition of the inherent useful-
ness of disclosure of time spent by government actors,103 that recognition
has not led to a strong movement for further disclosure of legislator time.
For example, Senator Kirsten Gillibrand’s website states that she is
“proud to lead by example as the first member of Congress ever to post
their official daily meetings online every day, so New Yorkers can see
who is lobbying their Senator and for what.”104  The calendar of official
meetings is commendable, but by only providing general descriptions of
“public” meetings, the calendar necessarily fails to capture many of Sen-
ator Gillibrand’s activities that would provide valuable information to
voters.105  Extending the disclosure requirements would transform the
current array of information available, providing voters with more infor-
mation on which to base their decisions.
102 It is most important that the public learn about the time incumbents spend fundraising.
Requiring only incumbents to divulge the information, however, creates unfairness that can be
avoided by making the rule also apply to challengers.  Further, the public may well benefit
from learning the amount of time a challenger is spending fundraising versus performing other
campaign functions, such as meeting with and speaking to the electorate.
103 See Parts III.A.1–3, infra.
104 See Kirsten Gillibrand, Schedule of Official Meetings, UNITED STATES SENATE, http://
www.gillibrand.senate.gov/newsroom/schedule/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2013) (listing her schedule
for all website visitors).  Senator Gillibrand also posts her financial disclosure report on her
website.  The Sunlight Foundation reports that four other senators and three representatives
post their daily schedules online. Members of Congress Posting Schedules Online, OPEN CON-
GRESS, http://www.opencongress.org/wiki/Members_of_Congress_posting_schedules_online
(last modified Aug. 1, 2013 15:04).
105 See Marc Heller, Sen. Gillibrand Praised for Online Posting of Daily Schedule, WA-
TERTOWN DAILY TIMES (Apr. 13, 2009) http://www.watertowndailytimes.com/article/200904
13/NEWS02/304139973/-1/NEWS (noting that duration of meetings is not revealed and that
information is not archived, so is unavailable one day after meetings occur).
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1. Public Information Benefit
One principal benefit of disclosure laws is the information the laws
provide to the public.  While this benefit has been challenged as overly
simplistic, the public has an undeniable interest in knowing the source of
political speech and the identities behind those contributing to the elec-
tion of a candidate.  Any disclosure scheme that seeks to benefit the pub-
lic in this manner, however, should be designed to provide the most
useful information to the voter.  Despite their value, current disclosure
provisions (even if the loopholes were closed) are insufficient for reasons
outlined above in Part II.C.  Adding legislator time reporting would be a
step toward providing more complete, valuable information to the voter.
There is a strong public interest in making legislators’ fundraising
activities more transparent.  First, it provides a way for voters to deter-
mine how a legislator is carrying out the mandate she has received by
being voted into office.  If a congresswoman spends a large amount of
her time making fundraising calls or hosting fundraising events, voters
should have the opportunity to assess her effectiveness with that knowl-
edge in mind.  Often, information concerning time spent fundraising
would be more valuable to voters than the identity of a legislator’s do-
nors.  For a simple legislative race, the identity of small dollar donors is
often meaningless, and the identity of larger donors may simply confirm
what voters already know about a candidate.  However, a news report
revealing that a voter’s representative spent an outrageous amount of
time fundraising could lead undecided voters to vote against the incum-
bent because they disapprove of her use of time.106  Conversely, a voter
may hear that his representative spends comparatively less time raising
money, and may decide to vote for her based on that knowledge.
Additionally, the information would provide benefits outside indi-
vidual elections.  If the public became more cognizant of the way in
which their representatives were spending time, it is likely that media
and the public would increase pressure on Congress to implement poli-
cies allowing leaders to focus on running the country rather than
fundraising.
Though implementing these disclosure requirements may seem to
provide an unprecedented level of transparency, it can also be viewed as
an attempt to provide voters with a tool to assess their representatives
that has long been missing.  Clearly, voters already can find out how
their representatives vote on any issue before the House or Senate.  They
can also discover more information about representatives’ legislative ac-
106 If the disclosure requirements were more stringent, for example by requiring informa-
tion about the identity of the person with whom a legislator spends time, voters would garner
unprecedented information concerning the amount of access money can buy; journalists would
gain greater power to connect legislative action with access. See infra Part III.C.1–3.
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tivities,107 personal finances,108 and, of course, campaign finances.
Given the broad recognition of the value of these disclosures, there is
little justification for keeping legislators’ main activity secret from
voters.
The current transparency requirements demonstrate the importance
of allowing the public to learn as much as possible about candidates.
Other incidents demonstrate this importance.  For example, most candi-
dates for president disclose several years of their tax returns in an effort
to provide voters with information about their personal lives.  In the sum-
mer of 2012, the national news was littered with stories examining Mitt
Romney’s refusal to release tax returns for any years prior to 2010.  As
Romney continued to refuse to release the returns despite attack ads by
the Obama campaign, fellow Republicans began to encourage him to ad-
here to typical practices.109
If personal financial information raises such fervor, information
about candidates’ fundraising practices should create even greater inter-
est for voters—data concerning legislators’ fundraising informs the elec-
torate about their personal choices as they relate to their public
responsibility, while tax returns address only personal choices in the pri-
vate sphere.  Research has shown that fundraising activities often occupy
more of a legislator’s time than any other function, clearly affecting indi-
107 Federal government proceedings can be seen on C–SPAN and on live streams via the
Internet. See, e.g., House Committee Live Streams, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS THOMAS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/video/house-committee (last visited Oct. 3, 2013).  Other websites track
members’ votes and package information in easily-digestible formats, such as graphs that pro-
vide information concerning legislators’ missed floor votes. John Sullivan, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/members/john_sullivan/400392 (last visited Oct. 3, 2013).
108 The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 requires government officials to file annual
reports concerning their personal finances. See Center for Responsive Politics, About the Re-
porting Requirements, OPEN SECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/pfds/disclosure.php (last
visited Oct. 3, 2013).  Among required disclosures are
earned and unearned income, assets and related transactions, liabilities, contributions
made in lieu of honoraria, gifts received, non–governmental positions held, travel
that was paid for or for which the filer was reimbursed, and various agreements into
which the filer has entered.  Information relating to the spouse and dependent chil-
dren of the filer is also reported in many cases.
Id. In 2012, the STOCK Act was signed into law, explicitly prohibiting members of Congress
from trading on non-public information.  Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of
2012 (STOCK Act), Pub. L. no. 112–105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012).  As a part of the law, legisla-
tors and some executive employees must report securities transactions more frequently and
disclose mortgages on personal residences. See Center for Responsive Politics, About the Re-
porting Requirements, OPEN SECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/pfds/disclosure.php (last
visited Oct. 3, 2013).  Soon the information will be available in an online database.  Center for
Responsive Politics, A Primer on the STOCK Act, OPEN SECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/
pfds/stockactprimer.php (last visited Oct. 3, 2013).
109 See Michael D. Shear & Trip Gabriel, Romney Steadfast in the Face of Growing Calls
to Release More Tax Returns, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 2012/07/
19/us/politics/romney-steadfast-against-release-of-more-tax-returns.html.
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vidual pieces of legislation (that do not receive the attention of a legisla-
tor because of time constraints) and the overall workings of our
democracy.110  Given the enormous, well-documented effects of the time
legislators spend fundraising, voters should expect to have, at the very
least, basic information concerning the amount of time their representa-
tive has devoted to securing reelection.
Moreover, the information that would be produced by disclosure of
fundraising time provides the best type of cue to voters because it fo-
cuses on one salient piece of information about each candidate.111  By
focusing on a smaller number of disclosures that have greater meaning,
voters are more likely to be able to use the information provided.
Smaller amounts of information are also widely publicized more easily.
As Michael Kang has argued in advocating an idea he calls “disclosure
plus,” “effective disclosure measures would publicize the most useful
information about the most interested parties, without adding to voter
confusion by publicizing distracting information about others.”112
Though Professor Kang’s argument concerned disclosure of ballot mea-
sure supporters, the same assessment of usefulness applies to the law
proposed here.  Many voters lack the time or ability to properly perform
a full assessment of their representatives’ performance.  Though they can
look at voting records and perhaps their representatives’ campaign ads or
speeches in Congress, this provides a limited picture of members’ activi-
ties.  It is impossible to expose all the activity the public would like to
see, but disclosing time spent fundraising is a step in the right direc-
tion.113  Importantly, dissemination of that information could meet the
criteria discussed by Professor Kang: A small amount of significant in-
formation could be widely disseminated, leading to the most widespread
and efficient use of the data.
Aside from assisting voters, comprehensive information concerning
fundraising time would provide valuable information to scholars and
policymakers studying the way our government functions.114  Most obvi-
110 LESSIG, supra note 50, at 121–24. R
111 Though requiring legislators to report time spent engaging in specific methods of fun-
draising would complicate the information presented slightly, the overall number of hours
spent fundraising would obviously still be provided, and would be easily reported and
digested.
112 Kang, supra note 25, at 1179. R
113 Fundraising time should probably not be seen as strictly a heuristic cue because it
provides more than a simple shortcut to voters—like a list of a legislator’s floor votes, it
provides direct information (rather than a proxy) about legislators’ actions upon which they
can be judged.  It could also serve, however, as a shortcut for voters to assess a legislator’s
dedication to his district and the nation versus his dedication to securing reelection.
114 See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 20, at 258 (listing “facilitating the study and knowledge R
of political behavior” as additional reason for campaign finance disclosure); see also Ellen L.
Weintraub & Samuel C. Brown, Following the Money: Campaign Finance Disclosure in India
and the United States, 11 ELECTION L.J. 241, 253 (2012) (“Academics and civil society groups
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ously, disclosure of fundraising time would make it easier to determine
the amount of time legislators spend fundraising rather than performing
other functions.115  Knowledge about that time ratio could assist those
who study the issue in assessing ways to prevent fundraising from nega-
tively impacting our democracy.  For example, Rick Hasen argues that
courts should allow restrictions on lobbying and corporate spending in
elections to protect the national economic welfare.116  A similar argu-
ment could be made based on the overwhelming amount of time our
Congress dedicates to fundraising; however, it is impossible to properly
analyze the issue when comprehensive data do not exist.  Legislator dis-
closure of fundraising time would provide the raw material that scholars
need to fully examine such issues.
2. Changing Legislators’ Behavior
Perhaps more importantly, requiring disclosure of legislators’ fun-
draising time would discourage representatives from spending an exces-
sive portion of their time fundraising.  Successful disclosure or
transparency policies in all fields not only inform voters or consumers,
but the disclosers “perceive and understand users’ changed choices” and
“improve practices or products.”117  As one scholar has explained in an
article concerning the costs and benefits of corporate disclosure, regula-
tors considering a certain disclosure provision will ask the question:
“Will the forced disclosure of information deter undesirable forms of be-
havior about which information must now be disclosed?”118
Current disclosure laws seek to alter legislators’ behavior in certain
ways—aside from trying to prevent corruption that might otherwise oc-
cur, they sometimes shame politicians into returning donations from
such as the Campaign Finance Institute and the Center for Responsive Politics further enhance
the public’s understanding of campaign finance issues with their sophisticated analyses of the
data made available by the FEC.”).
115 Vermont sought to ameliorate the effects of the fundraising time issue in passing ex-
penditure limits, but the Supreme Court dismissed the argument with little consideration.  Ran-
dall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 245 (2006). See also infra note 133. R
116 Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV.
191, 198 (2012) (“If courts accept the national economic welfare rationale as a sufficiently
important interest to justify some lobbying laws, the rationale could have much broader impli-
cations.  Most importantly, following the Citizens United case, the rationale could justify rees-
tablishing limits on corporate spending in candidate elections, or at least reestablishing such
limits as to government contractors.”).
117 FUNG ET AL., supra note 10, at 6 (summarizing positive benefits of disclosure regimes R
in general); see also La Raja, supra note 20, at 239–40 (explaining that “politicians might alter R
their behavior when they know it is easier for others to keep track of their campaign finances”
and “such adaptive behavior by politicians is precisely what many political reformers sought
by improving disclosure”).
118 Geoffrey A. Manne, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 476 (2007) (arguing that in asking this
question, regulators sometimes fail to “consider that more nuanced behavioral responses may
accompany this reduction”).
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questionable figures.119  However, the law proposed in this Article would
change legislators’ behavior in a different way: legislators forced to dis-
close the amount of time fundraising could be expected, in some circum-
stances, to pare down the time they spend fundraising in order to avoid
garnering negative reactions from the public and the press.  If such infor-
mation were available to the public, it would undoubtedly appear in
newspapers and television attack ads.  While disclosure would not pre-
vent members of Congress from spending significant time fundraising,
members of Congress might try to avoid spending amounts of time that
would shock voters or significantly exceed their rivals.120
Many have argued, and common sense dictates, that legislators who
spend less time fundraising have more time to devote to quality govern-
ance.  Estimates vary, but most agree that members of Congress spend
between thirty and seventy percent of their time raising money,121 most
notably on the banausic task of “dialing for dollars,” or making telephone
solicitations to potential contributors.  This is understandable, since in
the 2010 midterm elections, the average winning candidate for the House
of Representatives spent over $1.4 million on his campaign, and the av-
erage winning Senate candidate spent about $9.8 million.122  If a repre-
sentative needs to raise $1.4 million in two years, that amounts to almost
$14,000 per week.  For a senator to raise $9.8 million in six years would
require raising over $31,000 per week.  Members of Congress explain
with frustration that fundraising for an election can begin before being
sworn in from the previous election.123
Countless legislators lament the current situation, saying that mem-
bers of Congress “spend too much of their time dialing for dollars rather
than sitting in their committee room and protecting the dollars of their
119 See Obama Campaign Returns $200,000 Donation from Fugitive’s Family, supra note
30 (discussing Obama’s return of $200,000 bundled by family members of fugitive).
120 More comprehensive disclosure laws, such as those requiring legislators to identify
their contacts with donors, would of course provoke more extensive changes in behavior.  In
her article advocating for disclosure of legislator-lobbyist contacts, Anita Krishnakumar has
made a similar point about disclosure laws encouraging behavior that will meet voter approval:
“The threat of [exposure of a legislator’s meetings with lobbyists], could encourage (or force)
elected officials, or at least their staffs, to split their dance cards more evenly between oppos-
ing interests for fear of how it will look to the electorate, and other interest groups, if lobbying
disclosures reveal them to be unduly partial to one set of interests.”  Krishnakumar, supra note
6, at 541.
121 LESSIG, supra note 50, at 121.  According to The California Group, a firm “helping R
political . . . clients craft and execute their fundraising/public affairs strategy,” “[d]epending on
the stage of the campaign, a candidate should devote 40 to 60 percent of their day making
fundraising calls.”  The California Group, The Importance and Value of Call Time (July 20,
2011), http://www.calgroupinc.com/2011/07/the-importance-and-value-of-call-time/.
122 Center for Responsive Politics, Election Stats: 2010, OPEN SECRETS, http://www.open
secrets.org/bigpicture/elec_stats.php?cycle=2010 (last visited Oct. 3, 2013).
123 See Leahy, supra note 53 (lamenting that “in modern American politics, some cam-
paigns never end, and many politicians never get off the fundraising treadmill”).
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constituents.”124  Anecdotal descriptions of the congressperson’s fun-
draising life in Washington paint a bleak picture of government.  Repre-
sentatives describe rushing off the Hill to the phone bank in their party’s
congressional campaign office in spare moments, as well as squeezing in
as many evening fundraisers as possible after floor votes finish.125  Rep-
resentative Chris Murphy explained that “[o]n any given day, the foot
traffic to and from the national Republican and Democratic campaign
offices is constant, and the conditions under which we labor are pretty
depressing.”126  He added that “with several hours of every day dedi-
cated to raising the millions of dollars necessary for reelection, I simply
cannot devote all of my energy to solving problems.”127  Former repre-
sentative Eric Massa explained that “Congressmen spend between five
and seven hours a day on the phone, begging for money.”128  The days in
which members of Congress deliberated with one another are over, due
in part to the fact that members are constantly fundraising: “bells . . .
ring; members race from wherever they are (which is most likely just off
the Hill, making fund-raising telephone calls) to the floor; they are in-
structed by their staff as they enter the Chamber what the vote is and how
they are to vote.”129
The effects of turning our representatives into fundraisers rather
than deliberators are apparent.  Studies show that as fundraising demands
have risen, congressional committee meetings have gone down.130  Fur-
ther, members note the lack of collegiality (and bipartisanship) engen-
dered by rushing to fundraisers rather than dining or drinking with
congressional colleagues.131  Based on these concerns, some have even
pushed for the Supreme Court to consider the interest in protecting legis-
lators’ time as a compelling interest justifying spending limits,132 but
124 LESSIG, supra note 50 at 123. R





128 Ben Smith, Hating Call Time, POLITICO, March 11, 2010 (internal quotation marks
omitted), http://www.politico.com/ blogs/bensmith/0310/Hating_call_time.html.  The article
notes that other freshman members called this number “something of a stretch,” but said it was
not far from accurate.
129 LESSIG, supra note 50, at 144. R
130 Id.
131 See Murphy, supra note 125. R
132 Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fundraising: Why Campaign
Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281,
1283-84 (1994) (arguing that “candidate time protection” is the rationale that “holds the most
promise of answering First Amendment concerns” regarding spending limits).
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several years ago the Supreme Court brushed the idea aside with little
serious consideration.133
There are numerous benefits to be derived from removing legisla-
tors from the hamster wheel of the money race.  For example, if legisla-
tors are dissuaded from spending inordinate amounts of time with a
certain number of large donors, they might also find reason to spend time
with other people or interest groups that they might not otherwise meet,
both during campaigns and their time in office.134  There is good reason
to believe that politicians who spend time with more diverse groups of
people are more educated and understanding about a wider variety of
concerns held by their constituents.135  Discouraging legislators from
spending time fundraising might encourage them to seek money from
sources that require less of a time burden, such as small Internet dona-
tions or low-cost fundraising events.136
In addition to impairing government after elections are decided, the
current fundraising demands discourage high quality potential candidates
from running.  In the Federalist Papers, James Madison opined that a
large republic would be advantageous because of its ability to attract the
very best representatives.137  Though that may have held true for some
period of time after the founding, today it likely does not, due to legisla-
tors’ severely altered job description.  Aware that a job in Congress
133 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 245 (2006).  The Randall Court engaged in essen-
tially no analysis in rejecting the time protection rationale, relying instead on Buckley v. Valeo
and stating that it was “highly unlikely that fuller consideration of this time protection ratio-
nale would have changed Buckley’s result.”  It then cited to a portion of Buckley v. Valeo that
dealt with FECA’s public financing law as evidence that the Buckley Court was aware of the
time protection rationale, and also noted that “in any event, the connection between high cam-
paign expenditures and increased fundraising demands seems perfectly obvious.” Id. at
245–46.
134 See Blasi, supra note 132, at 1283-84 (arguing that “[a] major goal of campaign fi- R
nance reform . . . ought to be” protecting time, so that legislators can spend more time on
constituent service, and that when a legislator cannot “spend her time considering . . . the
grievances, information, and ideas of non-donors . . . the process falls short”).
135 For example, in writing about the Voting Rights Act, one commentator has argued that
crossover districts are superior to majority-minority districts because they reward candidates
who appeal across diverse racial groups.  Jason Rathod, A Post–Racial Voting Rights Act, 13
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 139, 196 (2011).  Similarly, candidates with less incentive
to raise money and time to meet with more diverse portions of the electorate may gain broader
appeal.
136 Recent research has shown that legislators who seek donations from a wider swath of
the electorate more deeply understand a broader set of concerns.  As explained below, based
on this research, it may be best to include an exception from the time reporting requirements
for low-dollar fundraising events.  See infra Part III.C.3 and n. 169.
137 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 82-83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (argu-
ing that “as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than
in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success
the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being
more free, will be more likely to center on men who possess the most attractive merit and the
most diffusive and established characters.”).
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would require constant fundraising and comparatively little attention to
legislative tasks, those who have a high level of expertise or intelligence
may opt to remain in the private sector or serve in alternative government
roles.138  Not only does the de facto telemarketing requirement prevent
the public from benefiting from such legislators, it also means that the
people who do seek Congressional positions are those most likely to suc-
ceed at raising money and tolerate the burden.139
Multiple factors have created the current campaign finance picture
as it exists today, principally the contribution-expenditure dichotomy
born in Buckley v. Valeo almost forty years ago.  Forcing legislators to
disclose the time they spend fundraising will not erase this problem or
other major campaign finance conundrums.  However, as with disclosure
generally, if implemented effectively, the proposed law could provide
voters with valuable information and have a significant effect on legisla-
tors’ decisions about how and when to raise money.  With a disincentive
to spend time raising money, legislators will be encouraged to spend
more time focusing on the jobs they were elected to do.
3. Disclosure of Fundraising Time Faces Fewer Obstacles than
Current Disclosure Requirements
Adding to the attractiveness of a legislator-focused regime, a disclo-
sure law requiring reporting of time spent fundraising avoids most of the
major problems discussed in Part II that undermine the effectiveness of
today’s disclosure laws.  None of the arguments made below are an at-
tempt to assert that current disclosure law should be replaced; rather,
they demonstrate that the additions proposed would run into fewer road-
blocks than those that currently predominate.140
a. Fewer Loopholes
First, a simple requirement of time reporting would not face the
severe coverage problems that currently plague federal disclosure laws,
discussed in Part II.B.  As with current laws requiring reporting of per-
sonal financial data, there is no obvious means by which to avoid making
the required disclosures.  A uniform requirement for members of Con-
gress does not allow for creative methods of avoidance, at least in the
138 As one freshman representative explained in 2007, “you could be Abraham Lincoln,
but if you don’t have the heart of a telemarketer, you’re not going to make it to Congress.”
See Leahy, supra note 53 (quoting Democratic representative Joe Courtney) (internal quotation
marks omitted). See also Murphy, supra note 125. R
139 Blasi, supra note 132, at 1302. R
140 Admittedly, the advantages discussed in this section derive partially from simplicity.
With simplicity comes a lower ceiling on potential effects.  For example, disclosure of time
spent fundraising likely could not hope to uncover evidence of quid pro quo corruption as is
possible with current law.
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same manner that is currently practiced by donors.  Legislators would
clearly be required to record and report time they spend at their party
committee phone banks, at fundraisers, and soliciting money from do-
nors in person.  While it remains a possibility that certain meetings and
phone calls could walk the line between fundraising and other topics, any
resulting underreporting would be minor, especially compared to the per-
centage of undisclosed money in the current system.141  Moreover, be-
cause the disclosers are legislators themselves, there will be a greater
spotlight on them and less incentive to walk the blurry line of legality as
certain political spenders are willing to do through use of 501(c)(4) orga-
nizations and other similar tools.142
b. More Useful Data That is Easier to Distribute
There are serious questions concerning whether voters can and do
effectively use donor disclosure as a means of making voting deci-
sions—those reporting the data may be biased, and information about a
candidate’s donors often will not provide much new information to a
well-educated voter.143  Timing issues and lack of voter knowledge about
campaign finance law can also prevent voters from turning campaign
finance data into useful, accurate information.144
Information about a candidate’s campaign finances is generally not
the top issue on voters’ minds,145 and for understandable reasons: a legis-
lator’s constituents are more concerned about issues that affect them di-
rectly, such as the economy.146  However, some data show that a
significant portion of Americans, especially independents, care about
campaign finance issues when they vote—one poll reported that two-
thirds of independents stated that reducing the influence of money in
141 See infra Part III.B.
142 Such organizations can spend money on elections and risk punishment after an elec-
tion—surely a deterrent, but not nearly the deterrent a candidate would face from skirting
disclosure requirements. See generally Ryan, supra note 61 (describing fines levied against R
527 organizations after 2004 election).
143 See supra Part II.C.
144 Id.
145 Polls are mixed to some degree, and generally pollsters group campaign finance issues
into one category, so it is difficult to tell how important voters find disclosure of campaign
spending.  In a January, 2012 poll, the Pew Research Center released a report showing that
only 28% of Americans considered “reforming campaign finance” as a “top priority” for the
President and Congress, the second-lowest ranked issue on a list of 22.  Pew Research Center,
Public’s Agenda for President and Congress 2001–2012 (Jan. 23, 2012), available at http://
www.people-press.org/2012/01/23/public-priorities-deficit-rising-terrorism-slipping/1-23-12-
9/.  One Gallup poll in 2008 found that “Corruption in Government” was found to be an
“extremely” or “very” important issue to 79% of voters, ranking fourth on a list of fourteen
issues.  Gallup Politics, Iraq and the Economy are Top Issues to Voters (February 13, 2008),
available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/104320/iraq-economy-top-issues-voters.aspx.
146 Gallup Politics, supra note 145. R
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politics is one of the most important issues to them.147  This means that
disclosure law should be formatted in a manner that will best overcome
the problems mentioned above so that voters who care about their repre-
sentatives’ fundraising—especially otherwise undecided voters—can
best use the information available.
Requiring legislators to report time spent fundraising would provide
voters with information that they clearly desire without facing obstacles
to usefulness that are to some degree inevitable with existing disclosure
laws.  In its most basic form, the proposed requirement would consist of
a simple number (of hours) that could easily be reported objectively by
the media and digested by the public; naturally, the information would
“readily translate[ ] into a voting cue.”148  Instead of sifting through
much meaningless data in order to find something of interest, reporters
and interested organizations would have straightforward numeric data
that could easily be communicated to the public.  Further, there would be
few or no timing issues or complex legal distinctions that would have an
appreciable effect on voters’ understanding of the information dis-
closed—all candidates would have to provide reports containing the
same type of information by a certain deadline.
On a similar note, the information would provide more than hints.
Disclosure of donations and spending serves to provide heuristic cues for
voters, but those cues are not necessarily straightforward because reasons
for donations are often murky, and the reasons for a legislator’s actions
can almost never be conclusively linked to previous contributions.  In-
depth research is necessary to link a legislator’s actions to a donor’s
money; any corruption that exists almost certainly cannot be proven.
Disclosure of time spent fundraising creates a more concrete yardstick by
which to make an assessment of a legislator’s time.
c. Less Chilling Effect
Finally, disclosure of time spent fundraising could not be attacked
on grounds that it chills private citizen speech or subjects donors to har-
assment.  As noted in Part II.D, supra, opponents of reform have recently
set their sights on existing disclosure laws, complaining that speakers
have faced boycotts and intimidation as a result of their constitutionally-
protected speech.  Even if a speaker does not fear harassment or boy-
cotts, current federal disclosure provisions can prevent some people from
speaking simply because they do not wish to have a light shined on their
147 Stan Greenberg et al., Money in Politics is a Ballot Box Issue, DEMOCRACY CORPS
(May 7, 2012), available at http://campaignmoney.org/files/may2012-pcaf-dcorps-memo.pdf.
148 Krishnakumar, supra note 6, at 539, 544 (noting that voters are typically disengaged
and require “information entrepreneurs” to provide useful, accessible information).
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political views.149  In their article criticizing compelled disclosure by do-
nors, Jim Bopp and Jared Haynie railed against requiring citizens to dis-
close their spending, arguing that the terms “disclosure” and
“transparency” should not be used to describe laws forcing private citi-
zens to disclose information; rather, the terms should apply when citizens
require information from the government.150
The law proposed here seeks only information concerning activities
of a legislator, and would not threaten to chill speech of private citizens
or subject them to threats or harassment.  Such a provision would meet
the true definition of a disclosure law as laid out by Bopp and Haynie,
simply trying to provide citizens with another barometer by which to
measure their elected officials.
A more robust version of such a law may not be quite as innocuous,
but still would present much less of a problem than exists with current
laws.  For example, if members of Congress were required to disclose
both the time spent fundraising and the identity of the donor with whom
the legislator spent that time, individual citizens would be identified.
However, revealing this simple information would almost certainly not
create the same risks that are felt by those who sign a petition supporting
a ballot issue or take a similar stance on a specific issue.  The principal
examples of retaliation or economic boycotts mostly relate to stances
people have taken on specific issues.  Proposition 8 supporters, for exam-
ple, were met with alleged threats and harassment because of their views
about gay marriage.  It is unlikely that individuals, or even companies,
would face similar threats if it was simply reported that a legislator had
contacted them to ask for a donation.  After all, contributions, and many
expenditures, are already reported.151
B. Practical Concerns
Some may object that requiring disclosure of time spent fundraising
would present practical difficulties and increase the burden on legisla-
149 Ho, supra note 86, at 437 (noting that some supporters of DISCLOSE Act hoped to R
“cause the supporters of one candidate, or one side of an issue, to refrain from saturating the
airwaves”).
150 See Bopp & Haynie, supra note 4, at 19 (arguing that “when the government demands
transparency (or ‘disclosure’) from its citizens, it can only be called political exposure, and it
is on that footing that the foundation of tyranny is laid”).
151 It could be argued that individuals should not be subjected to disclosure if they are
simply contacted by a government official and refuse to make a contribution or expenditure.
This concern could easily be allayed by a provision that does not require disclosure when
individuals refuse to donate or spend less than a threshold amount of time speaking with a
representative.
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tors’ offices.  Of course, some burden would be created,152 and its weight
would be determined by the level of disclosure required.  However,
members of Congress already keep internal calendars and track their fun-
draising activities—simply aggregating the number of hours spent fun-
draising would not likely create an excessive amount of work for
legislators or their staffs.153  The accounting required for such reporting
would not outstrip the work that must be performed to track and report
contributions.154
At the margins, it may also be somewhat difficult for a legislator to
determine whether a certain activity should qualify as “fundraising.”
While there might be some uncertainty in close cases, the bulk of fun-
draising activity consists of phone calls asking for money and fundrais-
ing events.  Members of Congress could easily record the time they
spend at their parties’ phone banks and at events specifically designed
for fundraising.  Any uncertainty that exists on additional fundraising ac-
tivities would not rival that of other campaign finance laws, such as the
issue of whether independent spenders such as Super PACs have illegally
coordinated their activities with a candidate.155
152 Other countries have recently passed laws requiring government officials to report
lobbying contacts.  Their experiences will likely be valuable in assessing practical problems
with such laws. See HOLMAN & LUNEBERG, supra note 77, at 20. R
153 See, e.g., Ben Smith, supra note 128, (quoting Representative Eric Massa, who ex- R
plained that making fundraising calls “includes filling out call sheets [and] detailing the
amount of money raised per hour”); Anita Krishnakumar addressed a similar concern when
writing in support of requiring disclosure of contacts between lobbyists and elected officials.
See Krishnakumar, supra note 6, at 558 (explaining that “elected officials and their staffs
already keep calendars listing their appointments, lunches, speaking engagements, and the like
with particular lobbyists and interest groups” and that such records could be used as a starting
point).
154 See, e.g., Ellen L. Weintraub & Samuel C. Brown, Following the Money: Campaign
Finance Disclosure in India and the United States, 11 ELEC. L.J. 241, 251 (noting that candi-
dates must “report essentially all of their financial activity, itemizing each contribution and
expenditure exceeding $200” and that the candidates must file quarterly and other reports).
155 Because campaign finance law treats contributions and expenditures differently, Super
PACs (which by definition make only expenditures) may not coordinate their spending with
candidates.  If there is coordination, spending is treated as a contribution under federal law.  2
U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (2011) (“expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consulta-
tion, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political
committees, or their agents, shall be considered to be a contribution to such candidate”).  How-
ever, there has been much controversy surrounding supposed skirting of the noncoordination
rule—it is obviously difficult to enforce, and few seem to believe that Super PACs and cam-
paigns are truly separate, especially since candidates’ former aides often found and direct
Super PACs. See, e.g., Kyle Langvardt, The Sorry Case for Citizens United: Remarks at the
2012 Charleston Law Review and Riley Institute of Law and Society Symposium, 6 CHARLES-
TON L. REV. 569, 574 (2012) (“In practice, noncoordination is a joke. Everybody knows the
big super PACs coordinate with candidates.”); see also James A. Kahl, Citizens United, Super
PACs, and Corporate Spending on Political Campaigns: How Did We Get Here and Where
Are We Going?, 59–Jun FED. LAW. 40, 42 (2012) (explaining that “candidates and their surro-
gates actively raise funds for Super PACs that support them,” and pointing out that Mitt Rom-
ney’s Super PAC re-aired a 2008 Romney campaign ad).
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For those contacts that are more ambiguous, the law’s details could
provide some assurances that the disclosure is for the most part accurate.
As a baseline, any meetings, telephone calls, or events that are specifi-
cally made in order to solicit contributions should be included.  To en-
sure that the law is not circumvented, an additional provision could
provide that all time must be reported when spent with those who spend
money on the candidate’s behalf within a certain time frame before or
after a meeting.156  These meetings would be presumed to qualify as fun-
draising, but a legislator could overcome the presumption with a report
about the meeting’s purpose.  This would of course be subject to certain
limitations, including an exception for legislator’s family or staff, and
perhaps other designated actors.
As with other disclosure regimes, a law requiring disclosure of fun-
draising time will inevitably face concerns over dishonesty and inten-
tional avoidance157—there will likely never be a way to be completely
certain that all of a candidate’s fundraising time is being reported.  The
important question is to what extent auditing (that does not unacceptably
invade a candidate’s personal privacy) can deter underreporting.
Perhaps the greatest concern is that candidates would use personal
phones and other devices to solicit money and fail to report it.  If candi-
dates are required to reveal the identity of those who they solicit, an
auditing system would be able to discourage underreporting by compar-
ing a candidates’ reports to the contributions received and expenditures
made—if candidate received many contributions (or money was spent on
her behalf) without reporting time spent contacting the donors in ques-
tion, an enforcement agency would look more closely at the candidate’s
reports.158  Inconsistencies might spur investigators to question donors
about communications received from candidates.
Candidates may be discouraged from underreporting due to the like-
lihood that they would have to involve their staffs—while it would cer-
tainly be possible for a candidate to perform fundraising without the
knowledge of their aides, doing so on a large scale would not be feasible.
If aides keep lists of contacts with potential donors, a candidate reporting
to his staff on the results of his fundraising efforts could easily at the
156 If the time window included spending that occurred before the meeting, it would likely
help measure a donor’s access, which should perhaps be addressed separately.  Such a provi-
sion would not encompass unsuccessful fundraising that is not explicit.  However, it is doubt-
ful that this situation is common enough to lead to significant errors in reporting.
157 See, e.g., Elisabeth Bassett, Reform Through Exposure, 57 EMORY L.J. 1049, 1070
(2008) (noting delay and avoidance efforts that thwarted effectiveness of federal lobbying
law).
158 This information could be publicized in order to achieve the greatest amount of trans-
parency.  To achieve the enforcement goals without publishing the names of those contacted,
the law could simply require reporting to the FEC without allowing for publication.
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same time also report the amount of time he spent fundraising.  Though
staff members might certainly collude with candidates to hide communi-
cations, the risk and burden of doing so would provide a significant dis-
incentive.  Further, aside from concerns about penalties, candidates
would be subject to criticism from the press and their opponents if their
reporting was suspicious: a candidate who reported a large contribution
without reporting any contact with the donor would risk creating nega-
tive publicity.
C. Counterarguments and Extension
The following subsections address some concerns that may be
raised about the proposed requirements.  While several of the concerns
are valid, the discussion below demonstrates that they should not prevent
implementation of the law.  The drawbacks that do exist are minor, both
in comparison to the benefits that the law would provide and in compari-
son to the drawbacks of existing disclosure laws.
1. Effect on Incumbents and Self-Funded Candidates
One argument that can be made against the proposed law is that it
would create a disadvantage for incumbents because voters would blame
them for time spent raising money while in office, while challengers
would not face similar scrutiny.159  Though this is a valid concern, it
should not prevent passage of such a law, for several reasons.  First, in-
cumbents are judged on their performance in office on a host of issues
that challengers never have to face.  Incumbents must make decisions on
votes, work with their own party and the opposition, and perform a mul-
titude of other tasks upon which they will be judged.  As with substantive
issues, an incumbent who performs better than average might gain an
advantage.  The same situation occurs with other disclosure laws—in-
cumbents can face negative press if their votes align closely with their
donors, or they have taken other legislative action that seems to favor
certain parties.  Challengers are generally immune from this, and it is an
unavoidable result of democracy.
Under the law proposed, challengers would also be required to re-
port the time they spend raising money.  While disclosure of that time
would not provide all of the benefits of incumbent disclosure, it would
nevertheless provide the public with valuable information that would
serve as a basis for comparison with the incumbent.  The information
would become even more helpful for voters if the challenger were
elected.
159 See Krishnakumar, supra note 6, at 561 (discussing disadvantage for incumbents if
contacts between lobbyists and legislators were disclosed).
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Any disadvantage that an incumbent may face is also minor in com-
parison with the advantage they often receive because of contribution
limits.  Incumbents have a built-in name recognition advantage, and low
contribution limits are often criticized as protecting incumbents by mak-
ing challengers’ races more difficult.160  A slight disadvantage incum-
bents may see because of increased criticism is already outweighed by
the contribution limit advantage.
The law could also be criticized on the grounds that it gives an ad-
vantage to self-financed candidates and candidates that benefit from
large independent expenditures on their behalf.  Once again, this concern
is valid, but is too minor to outweigh the benefits of the law.  Candidates
that need to raise little money on their own already enjoy a wealth of
advantages—they can focus more on legislating than fundraising and
they can devote their time to other modes of campaigning.  If they can
also boast about the fact that they spend relatively few hours fundraising,
it may seem unfair to others that are forced to spend a typical amount of
time fundraising.
Regardless of whether the law would result create a greater burden
for candidates that are forced to engage in more fundraising, it would be
difficult to argue that such a result should induce us to support secrecy.
Supporters of disclosure and good democracy generally see the value in
providing voters with as much information as possible.  Hiding informa-
tion because of a fear of unfairness is too drastic a reaction, especially
because it is valid and understandable for voters to prefer self-financed
candidates, who (similar to publicly-financed candidates) should be less
corruptible and less involved in fundraising.  It is unclear whether most
voters do feel this way, seeing that the public ostensibly feels at least
some trepidation about candidates who “buy their seats” in Congress161
or are particularly heavily-supported by Super PACs, which stir plenty of
controversy.  If those candidates attempt to tout their low fundraising
time numbers, opponents will be none too reluctant to point out the
causes of such low numbers.  Introducing these issues to the public de-
160 See, e.g., George F. Will, McCain–Feingold’s Wealth of Hypocrisy, WASHINGTON
POST (Nov. 22, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/21/
AR2007112101859.html (arguing that “by restricting the quantity and regulating the content
and timing of political speech, the law serves incumbents, who are better known than most
challengers, more able to raise money and uniquely able to use aspects of their offices—
franked mail, legislative initiatives, C–SPAN, news conferences—for self-promotion”).
161 A Google search for the phrase “‘buy seat’ in Congress” produces a plethora of news
articles and blog posts commenting on candidates attempting to finance legislative races. See
Peter Whoriskey, Growing Wealth Widens Distance Between Lawmakers and Constituents,
WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 26, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/grow-
ing-wealth-widens-distance-between-lawmakers-and-constituents/2011/12/05/gIQAR7D6IP_
story.html (discussing effects of wealth on members of Congress and view of some that per-
spective of wealthy is fundamentally different than that of middle or lower classes).
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bate will serve to improve democratic deliberation overall, and should
not be hidden because of fairness concerns.
2. Chances of Passage
Some argument can be made that it would be unlikely for Congress
to enact regulations burdening themselves in such a way.  Indeed, it
would require some measure of public push to persuade members of
Congress to enact laws creating greater responsibility for themselves.
Unlike Watergate, there will not be a large scandal involving time spent
raising money that will create outrage.  Yet disseminating knowledge
about the state of the political system might create at least some spark.
There may actually be reason to think that members of Congress
would be willing to impose such rules, just as members of Congress in
the 1970s were willing to impose contribution limits, spending limits,
and disclosure requirements.  It is often legislators themselves that sound
the alarm about the perils of campaign fundraising requirements.  Innu-
merable current and former members of Congress lament the demands of
fundraising.162  Disclosure rules would clearly not extinguish the prob-
lem, but could make some progress toward making legislators’ lives
better.
Congress has also shown on multiple occasions that it is willing to
regulate itself if there is sufficient call for reform and little valid reason
to oppose it.  For example, the recently-passed STOCK Act prohibits
members of Congress from using nonpublic information for private gain
and prohibiting insider trading by members of Congress.163  Members of
Congress (as well as other government officials) are currently required to
disclose certain financial information to the public by the Ethics in Gov-
ernment Act of 1978.  They must file annual reports of “earned and
unearned income, assets and related transactions, liabilities, contributions
made in lieu of honoraria, gifts received, non-governmental positions
held, travel that was paid for or for which the filer was reimbursed, and
various agreements into which the filer has entered.”164
While the existence of such requirements does not guarantee that
Congress will pass the law proposed, it provides precedent for the idea
that if there is sufficient backing and little legitimate reason to oppose a
law, Congress may see fit to act.  Furthermore, precedent could be set if
the proposed law was first passed in individual states.  Though this Arti-
cle discusses federal law for the sake of uniformity, experiments at the
162 See supra notes 124-29 and discussion in accompanying text.
163 PL 112-105, April 4, 2012, 126 Stat 291. See note 108, supra (discussing require- R
ments of STOCK Act).
164 Center for Responsive Politics, About the Reporting Requirements, OPEN SECRETS,
http://www.opensecrets.org/pfds/disclosure.php (last visited on March 9, 2013).
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state level would likely provide valuable precedent for adoption of a fed-
eral law.  Broad support of a successful experiment in one or several
states would be a beneficial tool in persuading wider adoption.
3. Effect on Super PAC Power and Solicitation of Small Donors
Some may also worry that forcing legislators to disclose the time
they spend fundraising would make it even more likely for legislators to
eschew direct contributions and seek outside money not subject to those
limits.  However, even the most basic version of the proposed law would
require legislators to report fundraising geared at independent spending
as well.  Under the current version of the regulations, candidates can ap-
pear at fundraisers that solicit money for Super PACs supporting
them.165  If they spend more time soliciting independent spending on
their behalf, they will still need to disclose that additional time.  Further,
the law already strongly encourages legislators to seek independent
spending, since there is no ceiling on spending by Super PACs,
501(c)(4)s, or anyone else spending independent of a candidate.  Any
minor effect the new disclosure law would have in further encouraging
solicitation of private funds would be vastly outweighed by the utility in
learning more about legislators’ fundraising.
On a related note, some may object to requiring disclosure of candi-
date time because it could discourage candidates from soliciting small
contributions from the electorate, instead hoping to squeeze as much
money as possible out of large donors or encourage Super PAC spend-
ing.  Commentators have recently attempted to demonstrate that when a
larger portion of the populace makes contributions, participation levels
rise and make our democracy more robust and representative of society’s
true interests.166  Any disclosure regime focusing on legislators’ time
should, to the extent that it is possible while still maintaining efficacy of
the law, avoid discouraging candidates from soliciting small
contributions.167
First, it is unclear that the proposed law would have a major nega-
tive effect on the type of fundraising that has been identified as benefi-
cial.  Much of legislators’ current time spent fundraising involves
telephone solicitation.  In soliciting small donors, candidates often now
165 Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1667 (2012).
166 See, e.g., Spencer Overton, The Participation Interest, 100 GEO. L.J. 1259 (2012); see
also Wesley Y. Joe et al., Campaign Finance Institute, Do Small Donors Improve Representa-
tion?  Some Answers from Recent Gubernatorial and State Legislative Elections (Aug. 2008),
http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/books-reports/APSA_2008_SmallDonors.pdf.
167 In a disclosure regime that identified the legislator’s contacts, there would likely be
less discouragement of soliciting small donors, because the media’s focus would likely be
more on the entities and individuals with whom the candidate spent time.
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rely on Internet fundraising,168 and sometimes “low dollar” community
fundraising events.169  From the perspective of campaign finance reform-
ers, Internet fundraising should actually be encouraged because it limits
the opportunity for corruption and requires a lesser time commitment
from candidates.170  Thus, discouraging fundraising hours would not nec-
essarily have a significant effect on legislators’ decisions to reach donors
outside of their typical sphere, and may actually encourage greater reli-
ance on those donors through increased Internet solicitation.
If implementation of such a disclosure requirement did begin to
drive down small donor participation, it is feasible that a law could be
passed excepting reporting requirements for in-person fundraising events
when the resulting contributions are below a certain threshold.  Though
there would be details to iron out in implementing such an exemption,
regulators could devise a system that would generally provide the desired
effect.  For example, the reporting requirement could be lifted for events
at which a certain portion of the resulting contributions were lower than
$500, or where the tickets cost under $100.171
4. Public Financing
There are clearly other methods for lightening Congress’ fundrais-
ing burden.  One of the most discussed is instituting a public financing
system for Congress.  However, even if a new major law were passed
that significantly reduced the time legislators spend fundraising, it should
be passed in conjunction with the law proposed in this Article rather than
in place of it.  If a public funding system were implemented, there would
remain a strong public interest in knowing how representatives spend the
time granted to them by their constituents.  If members of Congress
spend an average of twenty percent of their time fundraising, rather than
thirty-five percent, fifty percent, or seventy percent, voters still have a
right to assess their performance based on that number.
168 See, e.g., Ellen L. Weintraub & Jason K. Levine, Campaign Finance and the 2008
Elections: How Small Change(s) Can Really Add Up, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 461,
472-73 (2009) (noting that President Obama received 2.5 million online donations of $200 or
less in 2008, a number that matched the total number of $200 or less donations in the entire
2004 presidential election).
169 See, e.g., id. at 473 (describing donors spending five dollars to attend a large speech);
Gloria Borger, How to Stop a Cash Rush, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 8, 2007), http://www.usnews.com/
usnews/news/articles/070408/16glo.htm (arguing that there is “something democratizing”
about holding “low-dollar” fundraising events).
170 Weintraub & Levine, supra note 168, at 472 (“Raising funds over the Internet substan- R
tially limits the opportunities for the kind of actual or apparent improper influence that can
arise in direct face-to-face or telephone solicitations by candidates.”).
171 Borger, supra note 169.  It would be more difficult to ensure that such events do not R
essentially seek to entice large spenders to anonymously donate to Super PACs through corpo-
rate entities or to 501(c) organizations.  Avoiding this problem would be contingent on im-
provement of implementation of current disclosure laws.
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As mentioned above, FECA instituted an optional presidential pub-
lic funding scheme.  The Supreme Court upheld the optional public fund-
ing law in Buckley v. Valeo.172  Since then, a few states have made strong
efforts to induce candidates to accept public funding; Arizona’s effica-
cious system for enticing candidates to do so was recently struck down
by the Supreme Court.173  The presidential public financing system is
now essentially defunct,174 and there have been few signs that Congress
is ready to revive it, let alone institute a congressional public funding
scheme.  Even if such a system were instituted, it would not obviate the
need for disclosure of time spent fundraising.  As stated above, the infor-
mational interest remains.  But further, the Supreme Court has made
clear that public financing systems must be optional (and cannot be
overly coercive),175 and though candidates that accept public funding
generally spend less time raising money, those that reject the scheme
spend just as much time as they otherwise would.176  Thus, even if a
significant number of members of Congress opted into the system, the
fundraising time concern would remain for those that rejected the
system.
Further, a public financing system could not prevent outside groups
from spending on a candidate’s behalf.  With the rise in outside group
spending, candidates may increasingly rely on Super PACs and
501(c)(4)s to support their campaigns with legally uncoordinated spend-
ing.  If this is the case, even candidates who accept public funds may feel
compelled to maintain the torrid pace of fundraising, but do so by re-
questing that donors give to independent groups.177  Thus, though a pub-
172 424 U.S. 1, 86 (1976).
173 Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2913
(2011).
174 See, e.g., Catalina Camia, Obama, Romney Skip Taxpayer Money for Campaign, USA
TODAY (Apr. 27, 2012), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/onpolitics/post/2012/04/
mitt-romney-public-financing-presidential-campaign-/1 (noting that Buddy Roemer was the
only GOP candidate to take fundraising in the 2012 primaries, and reporting Rick Hasen’s
comment that “[t]his is the end of any kind of effective presidential financing system”).
175 See, e.g., Eric H. Wexler, Comment, A Trigger Too Far?: The Future of Trigger
Funding Provisions in Public Campaign Financing After Davis v. FEC, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1141, 1180 (2011) (“Courts considering the constitutionality of public financing systems as a
whole have undertaken such an analysis by insisting that they must not coerce participation
. . . .”).
176 Peter Francia & Paul Hernnson, The Impact of Public Finance Laws on Fundraising in
State Legislative Elections, 31 AM. POLITICS RESEARCH 520, 531 (Sept. 2003), available at
http://apr.sagepub.com/content/31/5/520.short (finding that state legislators who ran in states
without public financing spent an average of 28% of their campaign time on soliciting contri-
butions, compared with 27% of campaign time for legislators who rejected available public
financing).
177 Similar arguments could be made if Congress decided to raise contribution limits.
There are many who advocate for that course of action, especially on the right, but even if
Congress managed to come to an agreement on new, higher limits, the public information
interest in disclosure of time spent fundraising remains.  Moreover, raising contribution limits
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lic financing system may improve the current situation, it would not
eliminate the need for disclosure of legislators’ fundraising time.
5. Extension
While this Article principally advocates simple disclosure of time
spent fundraising, more demanding requirements would produce en-
hanced results and should continue to be examined.  For the reasons de-
scribed above, disclosure of legislator activity is a valuable tool that has
not been fully explored in the legal literature.  A natural extension from
time disclosure is a requirement focusing more on access to legislators,
which would essentially require disclosure of a member’s calendar, so
the public would know who has access to a legislator.  Preferably, a law
requiring such disclosure would also create a government-run system
linking those involved in meetings with a legislator with the amount of
money they contributed or spent in support of that legislator.  Such a
system could be supplemented by additional requirements of a candi-
date’s supporters: those making contributions or expenditures in excess
of a certain threshold could be required to report the time they spend
with legislators as well.  If this information were reported by both legis-
lators and their supporters, those required to report would have a greater
incentive to report accurately and regulators and the media would be
aided in verifying and analyzing the data.178
As Anita Krishnakumar explains, more comprehensive schemes
concerning government-citizen contacts do exist and have been promoted
by others.179  For example, regulations require the FCC and parties inter-
ested in its rulings to make certain disclosures concerning their meet-
ings.180  If interest groups or other parties make presentations to an FCC
decision-making panel, the presenter must submit copies of a summary
of the presentation to the FCC for the public record, and the Secretary
must notify the public of such presentations at least twice weekly.181
Furthermore, both Slovenia and Taiwan have recently passed statutes re-
quiring legislators to report their contacts with lobbyists.182  The exis-
might lessen the amount of time legislators spend fundraising to some degree, but there would
remain an interest in discouraging large amounts of time spent fundraising through disclosure
laws.
178 Krishnakumar has described the benefits of dual reporting in the lobbying context.
Krishnakumar, supra note 6, at 546–47.
179 Id. at 548.
180 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1200-1.1216 (2011).
181 47 C.F.R. § 1.1206(b)(1)-(4) (2011).
182 See HOLMAN & LUNEBERG, supra note 77, at 20 (“Perhaps the most unique aspect of R
the lobbying law in Slovenia is its emphasis on requiring government officials to report lobby-
ing contacts, which are then posted on the Commission’s Web page.”).  Slovenia’s Integrity
and Prevention of Corruption Act requires that
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tence of these more extensive disclosure requirements demonstrates the
potential for movement toward broader and deeper legislator disclosure.
CONCLUSION
Current federal disclosure laws provide valuable information to vot-
ers, and should be strengthened in order to ensure fairness and accuracy
in the public’s picture of campaign finance.  However, even if current
law were crafted perfectly and enforced to the best degree humanly pos-
sible, a large part of the picture is missing.  Scholars and lawmakers need
to begin to explore requiring more extensive disclosure of legislators’
activity.  The first and most simple step, advocated here, is to require
members of Congress to disclose the time they spend fundraising.  Infor-
mation about legislators’ devotion to fundraising provides important in-
formation that will assist voters in assessing their representatives’
performance.  Publicizing this information would also make the public
more aware of the fundraising issue in general, perhaps discouraging leg-
islators from devoting such egregious amounts of their time asking for
money rather than focusing on legislative tasks.
[t]he lobbied persons shall make a record on any contact with a lobbyist intending to
lobby containing data on the lobbyist: personal name, information whether the lob-
byist has identified himself/herself in accordance herewith, area of lobbying, name
of the interest organization or another organization for which the lobbyist is lobby-
ing, statement of any enclosures, the date and place of the visit of the lobbyist and
signature of the lobbied person.  The lobbied person shall submit the record within
three days as information to the superior and to the commission.
Art. 68(2).  The Taiwanese law requires lobbied persons to report “content of lobbying” as
well.  It can be found at: http://sunshine.cy.gov.tw/GipOpenWeb/wSite/ct?xItem=3806&ct
Node=380&mp=6.
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